THE IMPACT OF THE CHRISTCHURCH TERROR ATTACK
Tell MAMA Interim Report 2019
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The Christchurch terror attacks did not just take place in isolation. They took place because Brenton Tarrant immersed himself into an online world and where, at points, he donated to far right groups in Europe.

For nearly 10 years, we have been saying that anti-Muslim hatred was going to grow because of the interconnectivity of our world and social media platforms and where for about 5 years, between 2010-2015, social media platforms provided unfettered access to extremist groups and hate groups. Their defence of free speech and the ‘market of ideas’ winning out – i.e. ‘good winning out over evil’, was shown to be naïve at best and negligent at worst.

Our work in this report outlines the concept of ‘eco-fascism’ that Tarrant immersed himself into. This eco-fascism relied on heavily racialised, genocidal notions of population control and ecological salvation. This, as we go onto say, was rooted in false historical conspiracy theories about Muslims and outdated scientific analysis. This was also demonstrated by the notorious comments on his weapons which included references to Odo the Great, Charles Martel, 14 words, Edward Codrington and John Hunyati. Tarrant even included references to sexual exploitation cases in the United Kingdom, by referencing ‘For Rotherham’ on magazines for his automatic weapons. This demonstrated how much the grooming scandals have been used to fuel racial divisions by extremist far right groups.

Of particular interest, and which we have demonstrated, is how much Norse ideology was fused into the narratives of hate that became hard wired into the mind of Tarrant. The ‘Black Sun’ – an old Norse and Old Celtic ‘Sonnenrad’ or sun wheel, which was adopted by the Nazis and which Henrich Himmler etched into Bavarian castles in an attempt to build a mythical past of Germany’s heritage, was found on Tarrant’s weapons. At the heart of this, is a desire for identity which is found through murderous rage.

This report also shows how global anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia has become. An attack against a Christchurch mosque had significant impacts and a large measurable spike in anti-Muslim hate incidents in the United Kingdom was picked up by Tell MAMA. This showed a latency of anti-Muslim hate in some sections of communities in this country which were triggered by an attack against Muslims thousands of miles away; what is perverse is that instead of empathy and sympathy with British Muslims who felt the pain of their co-religionists in New Zealand, some thought it appropriate to spread more hate and intolerance at this sensitive and deeply distressing time.

For all of us at Tell MAMA, the attacks were a source of great pain and distress as the team worked tirelessly to support Muslim communities during the spike in reports. I would like to express my thanks to all the team of Tell MAMA for their professionalism, empathy and commitment during this time and always. I would also like to extend my deep gratitude to Shabana, Steve and Julene, who have been at the forefront of supporting victims and in their diligence in helping to ensure the voices of victims are heard and centered in our research, digital media output, and advocacy work.

Anti-Muslim hatred is a phenomenon that, sadly, will continue to be the ‘background noise’ which is measurable and easily detectable when there are major crisis points. However, as we have been told by victims, it is the ‘background noise’, the repetitive low level hate and discrimination that is targeted at British Muslims which wears down individuals, and a sense of pride and dignity in who they are. This is not acceptable and there is a duty on all of us who care about the future of our communities and our country, to challenge such hatred and intolerance, when we come across it.
1.1 Statement from Tell MAMA Team Members

Trigger events can and often lead to spikes of reports of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic abuse, discrimination, and violence. The spike following the Christchurch attacks was particularly difficult to deal with, given that 51 Muslims were murdered in an act of racist terror which violated the sanctity of religious worship and space.

The following statements are from staff members working in the Tell MAMA office at the time.

“As a Tell MAMA caseworker, I endeavour to be a point of resilience for those who suffer from anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia. I attempt to leave our service users with a sense of hope and strength to continue being who they are and to not feel ashamed of presenting themselves as they are, regardless of their ethnicity, religious background or any other characteristic which defines them. For the length of my role, I have seen and heard of a variety of incidents, considered both high and low level. To a certain extent, you become de-sensitised and accustomed to the language of those who are entertained by aggression and hatred. Coming from a restorative justice background, from time to time I even feel it is necessary to unpick the behaviour and actions of perpetrators, for us to better understand how to move forward and build a kinder society. Where appropriate, I have even asked service users to consider informally challenging intolerance with the best of character and intentions. However, the period following the Christchurch terror attacks challenged me, my views, and my role in the most unimaginable way.

It is important to remember, that outside of my work, I am an ordinary person who also has an identity and have in no way been immune to the effects of wider societal prejudice and racism. Especially as a British Asian Muslim, who grew up in one of the least diverse areas of the UK. You do not necessarily have to share the same background as people who have passed away in devastating circumstances, to feel the pain of those directly affected. The Tell MAMA team was subdued and ached in the immediate aftermath and the weeks following the attack. An ache which would only be exacerbated once we understood the reality of the views held by the those who we share the same country as.

Suddenly we were receiving an influx of reports of perpetrators believing it is ‘normal’ to make ‘gun’ and weapon gestures towards Muslim communities. Taking ownership of the attack by telling victims, ‘we shot up your mosque.’ Then, of course, the opinion of those online who are also average people we are living amongst. The same people who perceived Christchurch as ‘a job well done’, or a means of ‘karma’ for the Muslim community. People who ‘couldn’t be happier’ and viewed the live stream of the terrorist killings as a ‘movie’. This rhetoric was endless and exhausting to watch. I could not stop questioning how such beliefs are not readily accepted as an extremist or terrorist-type language. The terrorist attack became symbolic of the ingrained views held by some members of British society. Suddenly I could not encourage victims to feel hopeful, and I repeatedly asked my colleagues, ‘What now?! nothing will make this better.’ There was a feeling that whatever progress made in society was swiftly being undone.

When you hear countless stories of such prejudice, the language and rhetoric are no longer shocking, and you can even categorise the phrases used by perpetrators, the usual, ‘go back to your country’ for example. However, the sentiment at the time of the Christchurch attacks extended beyond this. The statement of us not belonging here was a lot louder and clearer. The idea that as Muslims, we are ‘subhuman’ and not worth any compassion. Rather we are just a spectacle, not pure enough and not deserving of life.
The abhorrent views of those supporting, condoning and congratulating the attacker were not just opinions. These were statements which were held by people for a length of time. Views, I suspect, that is usually buried in the confinement of one’s home and joked about at the dinner table. Now that the Christchurch attacks have opened a platform for those who hold such savage views, and we are more aware of what people think so to speak. I can say that every tragedy that has happened throughout the past few years, across the board, Muslims have come together to support those in need. We have not presented blanket animosity towards those who have suffered whether they share our background or not. We have never perceived the deaths of others as humorous, we have always promptly condemned horrendous attacks, opened our mosque doors to the public, created a dialogue with strangers. However, we are always made to justify ourselves and our being. When we ‘integrate’ the way others demand, we are told to go away, when we remain reserved and try and keep out of the way, we are told we are insular and segregated. This very hypocrisy is why I will continue to encourage our service users to be unapologetic about their identity, and urge each minority group in society, who faces systematic oppression, to continue to strive for success and be proud of their identity. For too long, those who thrive off division, violence and hatred (whether they act upon their views or not) have been given too much relevance and too much authority in the running of society.

There are enough decent members of society to counter the violent narratives which cause a divide. Including the people who left kind notes around mosques, who gathered to protect Muslims at prayer times, who attended vigils and stood unified to condemn the events of Christchurch.
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Between January 1 and June 30, 2019, 705 incidents were reported to Tell MAMA, of which, 529 were verified as anti-Muslim and Islamophobic in nature. Of those verified, 374 occurred offline, and 155 had occurred online.

• Between the same period, 20 police forces across the UK recorded 1,213 anti-Muslim incidents. Of these, 1,028 occurred offline, while 91 were online, and, for 94 reports, the nature of the incident is undisclosed.

• In the week following the terror attacks in Christchurch, incidents reported to Tell MAMA increased by 692%, with 12 incidents recorded in the previous week (March 8 – 14) and 95 the following week (March 15 – 21).

• In total, 74 offline incidents reported to Tell MAMA, or the police, made verbal or symbolic references to the Christchurch terror attacks.

• Between January and June 2019, 35% of Tell MAMA’s online incidents occurred in March. During this six-month reporting cycle, many online incidents were categorised as hate speech (N=97), more than twice the rates of abusive behaviour (N=33) and anti-Muslim literature (N=22).

• Abusive behaviour increased from 25 incidents in February to 41 incidents in March, a short-term increase of 64%. From February to March, threatening behaviour increased by 225%. More significantly, the rates of vandalism increased by 163% between February and March – of the 21 incidents of vandalism which took place in March 2019, 10 targeted mosques and madrasas.

• Tell MAMA verified a high volume of reports of discrimination (n=56) in this reporting cycle, demonstrating the deeper, more engrained attitudes targeted Muslim individuals through acts that denied them fair access to goods or services, in the workplace, or at educational institutions.

• Incidents in public areas increased by 192% between February and March, from 12 to 35 incidents respectively. Most significantly, anti-Muslim incidents targeting mosques or other Islamic institutions increased by 433% between February and March, from 3 to 16 incidents respectively. This again fell by 69% between March and April.

• The terror attacks at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand had a significant effect in the UK, resulting in a rapid but long-lasting increase in anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia.
3 INTRODUCTION

Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) is an independent, confidential and non-governmental entity which works on monitoring and tackling anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia. Primarily, our platform provides a secure and reliable way for people from across the UK to report incidents and access the support service they need. Reports can be submitted via our website, freephone, SMS, WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, and more. This report will present the data reported to Tell MAMA from January 1 to June 30 2019, alongside the data shared with us by 20 police forces in the UK.

Consistent with previous datasets, this reporting cycle has seen high-profile news stories and events informing anti-Muslim hatred and attention placed upon Muslim communities in Britain. In February, stories about Shamima Begum adorned the front-pages of several major newspapers, bringing countless commentaries on British citizenship, identity, terrorism, and the rights of Muslim women. In March, the Christchurch terror attacks dominated the news in the UK, and, in the aftermath, Muslim individuals faced increased levels of threats, mockery, and abusive behaviour. The suspect, Brenton Tarrant, a self-avowed white supremacist, will stand trial in June. 1 April brought the start of heatwaves and campaigning for the upcoming local and European elections, where the far-right agitator Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) launched his unsuccessful campaign to become a Member of the European Parliament for the North West. Shortly afterwards, a renewed hearing was launched against Mr Yaxley-Lennon concerning his contempt of court charges, and he was eventually found guilty. In the first week of June, Donald Trump made his second official state visit to the UK as President of the United States, and Theresa May resigned as Prime Minister, initiating the Conservative party leadership contest. The rest of the month was the hottest on record. Moreover, throughout the year, Brexit has permeated many aspects of British life and broadly dominated the news media, bringing discussions on immigration and patriotism.

The timelines show a distinct rise in anti-Muslim and Islamophobic incidents occurring in March. This reporting period demonstrates the terror attacks in Christchurch emboldened perpetrators in the UK, generating the greatest spike in reports to Tell MAMA since its founding in 2012.

This report will further evaluate the significance of this spike alongside an analysis of the ideology and network associated with Brenton Tarrant.

1 Although Tarrant has admitted to perpetrating the attacks, for brevity and legal accuracy we often refer to him as the suspect.
4 REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE: CHRISTCHURCH AND THE FIELD OF ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

4.1 THE IMPACT OF THE CHRISTCHURCH ATTACKS IN THE OFFLINE REALM

Since our last report, the wealth and breadth of commentary on anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia have steadily grown. Concerning the UK, several studies have continued the focus on experiences of Muslim women (Zempi 2019, McKenna 2019, and Chantler, Gangoli and Thiara 2018), as well as the relationship between Islamophobia and the 'War on Terror' (Abbas 2018, Gilks 2019, M-S Abbas 2018). Writers have also continued to expand the debate, for example, through discussing the psychological effects of colonialism in contemporary Islamophobia (Beshara 2019), investigating racialisation and the effects of Islamophobia on non-Muslims (Jhutti-Johal and Singh 2019), and presenting the benefits of intersectional solidarity between Muslim, trans, and other victims of hatred and exclusion (Hopkins 2019). Similarly, attention has been drawn to resistance movements (Morey, Yaqin, Forte 2019), such as through youth activism (Saeed 2019), social work (Scheyett 2019), and theories of humanism and decolonisation (Beshara 2018).

4.1.1 The Christchurch Attacks

In 2019, the efforts of writers and experts on anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia were captured by the unprecedented far-right terror attacks perpetrated against two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, which killed 51 people and injured 49.

The attack took place on March 15, 2019, during Friday (Jummah) prayers. The suspect armed himself with a range of customised weapons adorned with hand-painted phrases and symbols and was welcomed into Al-Noor Mosque before opening fire on the worshippers. After killing 42 people, he then drove to the Linwood Islamic Centre, where 7 more were killed. Around 50 others were injured, 36 of whom were treated for gunshot wounds.

The suspect, Brenton Tarrant, is a 28-year-old Australian national and self-avowed white supremacist. Shortly before the attack, he published a racist screed detailing his views and intentions, in the form of

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2 Zempi, Irene (2019) 'Veiled Muslim women’s responses to experiences of gendered Islamophobia in the UK' in International Review of Victimology, August 2019
3 McKenna, Ursula & Francis, Leslie J. (2019) 'Growing up female and Muslim in the UK: an empirical enquiry into the distinctive religious and social values of young Muslims' in British Journal of Religious Education
11 Morey, Peter; Yaqin, Amina; Forte, Alaya (2019) 'Contesting Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Media, Culture and Politics' London Bloomsbury
12 Saeed, Tania (2019) 'Resisting Islamophobia: Muslim Youth Activism in the UK' in Morey et al. 'Contesting Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Media, Culture and Politics' London Bloomsbury
an 87-page document posted on the infamous 8chan imageboard, along with a link to a live stream of the terror attack on their personal Facebook account.

Various scholars have investigated the responses to the Christchurch terror attacks, by the media, politicians, and the general public. For example, Evans (2019) questions why the calm display of empathy and action of New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda was radically different and suggested that she did precisely what a Prime Minister ought to. Moreover, Ardern offered an alternative to the ‘thoughts and prayers’ model often proffered by world leaders and asked what can be done differently in the face of such terroristic violence. The greatest difference perhaps was that she removed the name of the suspect from the discussion, reconfiguring focus towards the victims.  

While accepting the positive intentions behind those refusing to use the suspect’s name, to reject the attention he craved, Durie emphasises the importance of investigating their ideology and background. Anwar and Sumpter write the responses by various facets of the local community and beyond as being ‘thorough, constructive and inclusive’, broadly holding them as positive efforts to be encouraged and celebrated. Going further, Mirnajafi and Barlow suggest that the solidarity drives in the wake of the attacks will not fulfil their promises without “concrete action aimed at reducing Islamophobia, and making society a safer, fairer, and more inclusive place for Muslims.” They further detail the differences between ‘symbolic’ or ‘tokenistic’ expressions of solidarity and ‘concerted, deliberate, inclusive’ action.

Bringing a psychological analysis, Mirnajafi and Barlow assess the emotional responses to large-scale incidents. When groups such as New Zealanders feel negative emotions they are moved by a desire to ‘express and purge’ them, and, while this is helpful in the short-term for individuals, for the target group (here being Muslims) the distress is ongoing and more complex. Furthermore, the attacks ‘did not occur in a vacuum’ and, therefore, while the broader societal issues which gave rise to the targeted violence have not been eliminated, the target group cannot overcome their distress.

This calls for what Mirnajafi and Barlow call ‘ongoing, active solidarity’. They address the rising and substantial levels of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic prejudice in the English-speaking world, arguing that we, therefore, need ongoing, active solidarity to challenge it. Reaction-based, anecdotal, symbolic, tokenistic expressions of solidarity cannot overcome a systemic form of prejudice.

Moreover, Durie analyses the Christchurch attacks as the culmination of an ideology outlined clearly by the suspect in his screed and elsewhere, while Mirnajafi and Barlow refer to the attacks as the ‘deadly consequences of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment’. Similarly, Herrera and Sabaratnam assess the Australian responses to the Christchurch attacks and the effects it had on the climate of racism in Australia which gave rise to Tarrant’s plan and ideology. A day after the terror attacks, an anti-racist rally was already scheduled and, as Friday’s events unfolded, organisers collaborated with the Islamic Council of Victoria and gave the platform to Muslim activists. Over four thousand people attended to hear Muslim activists and politicians. People were in shock, but not surprised.

19 Ibid.
Acknowledging the gravity of concerns that Tarrant’s views were bolstered by the interconnected transnational ideological networks, broader online behaviours, as well as his travels abroad, they emphasise that the ‘homegrown’ influences in Australia ought not to be underestimated. They argue that the Christchurch attack, perpetrated by an Australian suspect, was a ‘product of decades of vitriolic Islamophobia and anti-immigrant racism’ in Australia. For example, the suspect’s screed included Blair Cottrell in his inspirations. Following the attack, an Australian senator Fraser Anning sparked fury with his analysis: ‘does anyone still dispute the link between Muslim immigration and violence?’. However, they emphasise that disowning and denouncing singular figures such as Senator Anning does nothing to tackle the rhetoric which led to his statement.

‘It shouldn’t take tragedies such as this to notice how entrenched racism and Islamophobia have become in Australia’.22

Graham (2019) turns to condemn those who clamour to avoid political discussions in the wake of a tragic event, and notes that such calls did not occur only after the Christchurch attacks. A journalist summed this up:

‘I feel so sad. We begged you to stop amplifying and normalising hatred and racism. But you told us we were ‘politically correct’ and ‘freedom of speech’ was more important. The more you gave the far-right a platform, the more powerful they got. We begged you.’ — Osman Faruqi

March 15, 2019

Graham also argues that the violent, pre-mediated acts committed by the Australian suspect cannot be removed from the historical context of Australian racism. He provides a comprehensive summary of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiment expressed by Australian politicians and high-profile campaigners, such as Senator Jacqui Lambie, and the harmful portrayal of Islam and Muslims in the news media. He emphasises that the views expressed in Tarrant’s video and screed are no different to those held and expressed by government, parliament, and broader leadership in Australia.23 Offering similar critiques, writer Shelina Janmohamed noted that the portrayal of the attacks by some media outlets amounts to the same ‘obfuscation, denials and dismissal of Islamophobia’ which perpetuated the cycles of fear and hatred which lead to the Christchurch violence. For example, she observes:

‘One right-wing UK magazine explicitly said: “This is not Islamophobia”. Another leading UK paper proffered the headline “A law against Islamophobia is a terrible idea.”’.24

McVeigh adds, similarly, that the Christchurch attacks were a culmination of the dehumanisation of Muslims on a global scale, quoting Terry Pratchett, ‘People as things, that’s where it starts.’25

Those analysing the discourse which emerged in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks have identified the relative merits of a strong condemnation of violence, criticised a tokenistic approach, and encouraged consistent solidarity in the future. Others have argued that the attacks themselves were galvanised by a pre-existing prevalence of the far-right and societal anti-Muslim sentiment.

Analysing the roots of the perpetrator’s ideology is important. The atrocities in Christchurch ought not to be treated as an isolated, ‘lone-wolf’ incident, as the views of the suspect did not occur in a vacuum.

23 Graham, Chris (2019) ‘Tears For Christchurch: Australia First Imported Hate In 1788. Now We’re In The Export Business’ In Chain Reaction Issue 135, pp. 34, April 2019
4.2 The Christchurch Ideology

There are three key sources for confirming the ideology of the suspect; his prior networking at home and abroad, the screed published online, and the symbolism used during the live-streamed attack. Another indication of his views is the letters and communications sent by Tarrant from prison since the attack.

4.2.1 Transnational Networks

Brenton Tarrant visited Greece,\textsuperscript{26} Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey,\textsuperscript{27} Israel,\textsuperscript{28} Romania\textsuperscript{29} and Hungary\textsuperscript{30}, some trips occurring only a year before the terror attacks. Tarrant also visited Pakistan, parts of South-East Asia, and North Korea. In 2016, according to the Bulgarian Prosecutor-General Sotir Tsatsarov, Tarrant visited Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, where his interest drew focus on sites of historical battles between Christians and Muslims, and obscure locations during the Ottoman wars in Europe in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{31} He paid particular interest to Balkan nationalism and historic anti-Muslim movements there, each exemplified by the Serbian war criminal Radovan Karadžić who was also glorified in Tarrant’s live stream (through the use of the Islamophobic propaganda song known both as “Remove Kebab” and “Serbia Strong”).\textsuperscript{32} He visited 11 semi-rural locations in Bulgaria, including the town of Plevin, made famous for being the site of a siege during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877 and 1878, and prosecutors in Bulgaria have launched an investigation into Tarrant’s presence in the country.\textsuperscript{33} Turkey is also investigating his time spent there, as authorities believe he intended to carry out a terror attack and/or assassination there.\textsuperscript{34}

There is increasing evidence of Tarrant’s active networking abroad. For example, records have been found of financial support offered to various groups and campaigns – Tarrant donated €1,500 to Martin Sellner’s Identitäre Bewegung Österreichs (IBÖ) organisation last year, along with large sums of money to Génération Identitaire. Pleasantries between Tarrant and Sellner went beyond mere exchanges of gratitude, as a chain of emails revealed a closer friendship between the two men, including offers to drink beer or coffee together if either man found themselves in Austria, New Zealand, or Australia. Austrian police then launched a terror investigation into Sellner’s connections to Tarrant, including the allegation that Sellner was working with Tarrant in creating a terrorist and “structurally fascist” organisation.\textsuperscript{35} In his native Australia, Tarrant frequently participated in far-right forums, such as United Patriots Front and True Blue Crew, and has been known to make violent threats online. He was described as “deeply engaged in a global alt-right culture”.\textsuperscript{36}

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\textsuperscript{26} Keep Talking Greece (2019) ‘Gunman of NZ massacre, Brenton Tarrant, stayed in Greece in 2016’ March 16\textsuperscript{th} 2019 https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2019/03/16/brenton-tarrant-greece/
\textsuperscript{30} Euronews (2019) ‘New Zealand shooter’s travels around eastern Europe under investigation’ March 16\textsuperscript{th} 2019 https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/16/new-zealand-shooter-s-travels-around-eastern-europe-under-investigation
\textsuperscript{35} The Guardian (2019) ‘Christchurch shooter’s links to Austrian far right ’more extensive than thought” May 16\textsuperscript{th} 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/16/christchurch-shooters-links-to-austrian-far-right-more-extensive-than-thought
4.2.1.2 The Screed

In this report, in order not to give legitimacy to the so-called ‘manifesto’, we refer to the suspect’s written works as a screed. Within the lengthy screed, Tarrant outlined his ideological views and inspirations, in a format which revealed his embedded understanding of dark internet subcultures and ‘shitposting’. This had a wider function: showcasing a deeper sense of self-awareness, by inserting other examples of ‘shitposting’ in his manifesto, like the Navy Seal Copypasta, Tarrant wanted to saturate media coverage, beyond the act of terror itself, and it worked (such examples will feature in later sections of this report). This tactic had a secondary, more dangerous aim: to draw others into the actual propaganda; from his ethnonationalist screeds to outright Islamophobic conspiracies of Islamisation, demographics, and the white supremacist myth of the “Great Removal”.38

He expressed his admiration for the attacks carried out by the neo-Nazi terrorist Anders Breivik in 2011, which killed 77 young Labour activists, and claimed to have had a "brief contact" with him.39 Similar to Tarrant, shortly before the attack in Norway, Breivik distributed his screed online via email, and admitted later that his main aim in carrying out the attack was to draw attention to his screed (which drew from a variety of Islamophobic and mainstream sources4041). Tarrant cited Breivik’s actions as a guide and inspiration to carrying out a terror attack, although he emphasised that his ideological alignment is based on:

- Eco-fascism – A form of population control based upon racist scientific conspiracy theories.
- Ethnonationalism – A strong emphasis on ethnic roots as geographically determined, thus race and ethnicity determine who has rights to each land.
- Oswald Mosley – A fascist campaigner who supported Adolf Hitler and proposed a system of eugenics and ethnic cleansing in the UK.

4.2.1.3 The Development of the Ecofascist Ideology

Environmental activism has been a positive, powerful force in the world, and the depth of research into eco-fascism has been painstakingly compiled by those resisting its co-opting of environmentalism. Foremost, Janet Viehl and Peter Staudenmaier addressed the prominence of animal rights and ecologist figures within the Nazi Party.42 Ecological policies thrived during the Weimar era, and by 1939, 60% of conservationists had joined the Nazi Party, compared with 10% of adult men, 25% of teachers and lawyers.43 The slogan “blood and soil” was coined by Richard Walter Darré, an ecologist who intended to connect a specific human race with a specific territory. The concept of eugenics sought to reduce ethical questions to biological certainties, and those who participated in particular kinds of animal slaughter, animal testing, farming, or fishing, were sent to concentration camps. The banning of kosher

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38 Ibid.
43 "A study of the membership rolls of several mainstream Weimar era naturshutz (nature protection) organisations revealed that by 1939, fully 60 percent of these conservationists had joined the NSDAP (compared to about 10 percent of adult men and 25 percent of teachers and lawyers)"
slaughter was one of the first decrees passed once Hitler and his party seized power, between 1933 and 1945, the Nazis passed 2,000 antisemitic decrees.\textsuperscript{44}

Advocates of population control to curb environmental problems have been active for centuries (for example, in the writings of Thomas Malthus). A prominent proponent was Pentti Linkola, an ecologist from Finland who combined misanthropy with ‘deep ecology’, a firm belief in the natural world and biological order over humanity.\textsuperscript{45} He wrote long intellectual missives proposing population control through ending immigration, introducing ‘licences’ so that only those ‘genetically and socially fit’ could produce offspring, and sacrificing ‘unworthy’ human life (being, those who did not understand or believe in him). Thus, eco-fascism emerged through combining ecological policies with fascist ideologies, rooted in the racialised science of eugenics which believed certain human beings were more valuable than others. These theoretical arguments and historic policies formed the basis for the ecofascist revival. Lamenting climate change and environmental destruction, Brenton Tarrant was, rather, motivated by the pursuit of population control and eugenics.

In summary, Tarrant’s screed proscribed a form of eco-fascism which relies on heavily racialised, genocidal notions of population control and ecological salvation. His targeting of a Muslim community lies in false conspiracy theories rooted in historic, outdated scientific analysis.

In the days which followed the attack, as Muslim communities mourned in New Zealand and abroad, and world leaders condemned the anti-Muslim and Islamophobic violence, some, on the darkest corners of the internet, were busy translating the terrorist screed into the major languages of Western and Eastern Europe. Upon investigation, Tell MAMA found that individuals had translated and disseminated copies in French, Dutch, Spanish, Bulgarian, Russian, and Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{46}

Moreover, while the suspect has been imprisoned, his communications from prison have been shared online. A letter from Brenton Tarrant posted on 4chan warned of a ‘great conflict’ and used language which encouraged preparing for violence.

4.2.1.4 Live Stream Symbolism: Weapons
The weapons were peppered with hand-painted quotes and symbols. These referenced historical events, people, and motifs related to conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Europe, as well as references to other recent terror attacks, amid a reference to child sexual exploitation cases in Rotherham, England.

Most of the painted historical references are highlighting relatively obscure events and leaders, and key themes involve the violent defence of ethnonationalist European identity, alongside an element of revenge, and a heavy focus on small but effective military movements. The references to historical figures who led defeats against Ottoman or Umayyad forces position himself alongside Obilic, Martel, and Traini, subtly emphasising their collective role as heroic defenders of Christianity and Europe. Despite the terror occurring thousands of miles away, the screed sought to inspire similar acts of terroristic violence in Europe.

Consistent with the ideas put forward within the screed, the symbols pre-prepared by Tarrant as an exhibition to the world is an attempt to mythologise a certain version of history to curate himself as a


hero, a soldier situated with a broader civilizational struggle.
Reconstruction of Christchurch Terrorist’s Weapons Figure 3

David IV of Georgia
Considered the greatest ruler in Georgian history, he defeated Turkish forces at the Battle of Didgori in 1121 before bringing most of the Caucasus under his control, ushering in the (Christian) Georgian Golden Age.

Serban Cantacuzino
A Romanian prince who planned to attack Constantinople and drive the Ottomans out of Europe.

Stefan Lazarević
A Serbian prince who served as a vassal for the Ottomans before later freeing his country from their rule and establishing an independent state.

Marco Antonio Bragadin
See figure 1.

Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg
The military commander who oversaw the defense of Vienna in 1683 – a company of just 20,000 men defeated the 120,000-strong Ottoman army.

Reconstruction of Christchurch Terrorist’s Weapons Figure 4

Luca Traini
Italian far-right extremist who shot six African migrants in the city of Macerata in February 2017. He was arrested while making a fascist salute with an Italian flag draped around his shoulders. He was sentenced to 12 years prison.

Bajo Pjivjanin
Born under Ottoman rule he switched sides during the Fifth Venetian-Ottoman War (1645-1669) to fight against his former rulers and was ultimately killed in battle. He was regarded as one of the greatest hajduk - a type of peasant infantry.

Battle of Bulair 1913
The battle pitted Bulgarian forces against a much larger Turkish force, attempting to break the Bulgarian blockade of one of their fortresses. The Bulgarians were victorious, losing only a few hundred troops compared to thousands killed on the Turkish side.

Sebastiano Venier
Doge of Venice who fought against the Turks during the Fourth Ottoman-Venetian War (1570-1573). As part of the Christian League, he decisively defeated the Turks at the Battle of Lepanto.

David Soslan
A Georgian King of the 12th and 13th centuries, made famous for his military victories over neighbouring Muslim-majority nations.

Dmitry Senyavin
A famed Russian admiral who fought in the successive Russo-Turkish Wars of 1787-1792 and 1806-1812.

Marko Miljanov
a Montenegrin general who fought several campaigns against the Ottomans.

Edward Codrington
See figure 1.

For Rotherham
A reference to the child sexual exploitation abuse scandal in Rotherham, a town in Yorkshire, which police have confirmed affected 1,150 victims over a 16-year period.

Alexandre Bissonnette
See figure 1.

Battle of Kagul 1770
The pivotal battle of the Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774, it saw around 40,000 Russian troops compared with 75,000 Ottomans. The Russians were victorious, losing only around 1,000 troops compared to 20,000 of their opposition.

Prince Fruzhin
A Bulgarian noble who fought against the Ottoman conquest of the Second Bulgarian Empire.

Novak Vujošević
Fought in the Battle of Fundins for the Principality of Montenegro against the Ottoman Turks. He killed 28 fighters and was later given an award by the Russian Emperor.
Reconstruction of Christchurch Terrorist’s Weapons Figure 5

Battle of Ivanikos (Boj na Ivanikovu)
The first major battle between Serbian forces and the Ottoman Empire in 1662, the latter were defeated.

Pavlo Sergiyovych Laplyh
(Taio Serzhiovich Lapthyn)
A far-right terrorist from Ukraine, Laplyh murdered Mohammed Saleem in Birmingham and targeted mosques in the West Midlands in 2013. He is serving a life sentence.

Horogszegi Szilágyi Mihály
Michael Szilagyi, Hungarian general who was captain of the Belgrad fortress when it came under siege by the Ottomans in 1456. The battle ended in victory for the Hungarians.

Bohemond I of Antioch
Founded the Norman monarchy in Antioch and led the first Crusade ordered by Pope Urban II to retake the Holy Land from Seljuk forces between 1096 and 1099. It led to the re-capture of Jerusalem and the establishment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Konstantin II Asen
Constantine II of Bulgaria, a Bulgarian noble and ally of Stefan Lazarevich, who is mentioned on another of Tarrant’s weapons. He led a rebellion against the Ottomans which lasted for half a decade but ultimately ended in defeat.

Gaston IV, Viscount of Béarn
A participant of the First Crusade who was the first to enter Jerusalem after the defensive walls were breached.

Reconstruction of Christchurch Terrorist’s Weapons Figure 6

Milos Obilic (Милош Обилић)
A knight in the service of Prince Lazar (mentioned elsewhere on the weapons), he is credited with killing Sultan Murad I during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The event has become mythologised, including amongst hardened nationalists, which is known more broadly as the “Kosovo myth”. It became a symbol of the struggle for freedom from foreign domination, and a powerful tool for national unity when Serbia gained independence from the Ottomans in the 19th century.

Josué Estébanez
A Spanish neo-Nazi who murdered 16-year-old anti-fascist Carlos Patonero on a Metro train in Madrid in 2007. Estébanez remains a cult figure in fascist and far-right spaces online.

Sigismund of Luxembourg
A European nobleman who rose to be Holy Roman Emperor, he led the Crusade of Nicopolis against the Ottomans in 1396. The campaign was a disaster and ended in defeat, along with the collapse of the Second Bulgarian Empire.

Vienna 1863
See figure 2.

- Acre 1189
During the Third Crusade, a two-year siege at the Muslim city of Acre resulted in defeat for its ruler Saladin and resulted in the recapture of a crucial strategic port for the crusaders.

Feliks Kazimierz Potocki
A Polish nobleman and military leader known for leading numerous campaigns against the Turks and Tatars, including fighting in the Great Turkish War. In 1686, he defeated a force of 14,000 Tatars with 6,000 men at the Battle of Podhajce.

“Battle of Sarikamish”
This reference, written in Armenian, recounts the Battle of Sarikamish, which saw heavy casualties and the eventual defeat of the Ottoman armies at the hands of the Russian Empire during World War One. The significance of the Armenian language relates to how the defeat (and subsequent scapegoating) was the prelude to the Armenian Genocide.

Jofis Gurko
A Russian field marshal who led troops into battle against the Ottomans during the Battle of Shipka Pass which is mentioned elsewhere on the weapons.

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4.2.1.5 Live Stream Symbolism: Music
Tarrant makes further symbolic references through his choices of music. While carrying out the attack, he was listening to ‘Serbia Strong’, a militantly Islamophobic anthem which praises the Serbian war criminal Radovan Karadžić. Its lyrics include lines like "The wolves are coming, beware, Ustashi and Turks," and "Karadzic, lead your Serbs. Lead your Serbs. Everyone must see that they don't fear anyone." As the gunman got into his car to drive away from Al-Noor Mosque, witnesses recall hearing the song ‘Fire’ by The Crazy World of Arthur Brown, particularly the line “I am the God of hellfire!”, hinting toward his fascination with Christian rule and Norse mythology. The ‘Serbia Strong’ video, known colloquially as ‘Remove Kebab’ has circulated on YouTube since at least 2008, generating millions of views. A reference to ‘stopping kebabs’ appeared in his screed and on his gun. Other songs include the Initial D track ‘Gas Gas Gas’ and a remix of the Waffen SS Choir’s ‘Grün ist Unser Fallschirm’, an audio track popular among fascists on YouTube and Soundcloud. Other song choices included ‘The British Grenadiers’, a military song featured in the anime film ‘Girls und Panzer’, in which high school girls fight each other using World War 2 tanks.

4.2.1.6 The Enduring Legacy of the Live Stream
As the tragedy unfolded, variations of the live-streamed video would infect the largest social media platforms, as sections of the tabloid press in the UK were criticised and accused of turning terrorism

into the shallowest form of clickbait.\textsuperscript{48} Analytics, provided by Facebook, reveal that the initial live stream had fewer than two-hundred viewers.\textsuperscript{49} The peak number of viewers hit around four-thousand before it was removed an hour later from the platform. Within a day, however, there were 1.5 million attempts to re-upload the video to Facebook, of which, 1.2 million attempts were blocked, meaning that 300,000 uploads slipped through. The company was not without criticism and admitted that due to the ‘rarity’ of such events, its artificial intelligence software did not ‘automatically catch’ it. Facebook did concede that it failed to prioritise the live stream for an “accelerated review” had users reported the content, and when it was eventually flagged, for reasons unrelated to suicide, a different process took over, demonstrating some critical flaws in the moderating process.\textsuperscript{50} Facebook has since adopted several policy changes, and will now, moving forward, direct those in New Zealand who view extremist content to websites dedicated to helping individuals leave hate groups.\textsuperscript{51}

Facebook is not without prior criticism for its attitudes towards far-right extremism on its platform, as in 2018, Channel 4’s Dispatches revealed that Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) and Britain First had “shielded review” status on Facebook.\textsuperscript{52} In effect, even when content violated the company’s Community Standards, it remained online, despite a clear policy to ban pages for repeated transgressions.\textsuperscript{53} A year earlier, Facebook had promised to do more to remove white supremacist and neo-Nazi content from its platform,\textsuperscript{54} following the violence of Charlottesville which included the murder of the anti-fascist activist Heather Heyer at the hands of the neo-Nazi James Alex Fields Jr, who drove into a crowd of counter-protesters and received a life sentence for his crimes in August 2019.\textsuperscript{55} In January 2019, Yaxley-Lennon was banned from Facebook and Instagram for repeatedly posting content which dehumanised and called for violence which targeted Muslims.\textsuperscript{56}

Tarrant’s alleged Twitter activity, which appeared three days before the terror attack, was soon removed from the platform. YouTube, however, refused to disclose any details of how many times the terror video was uploaded, but it emerged that “as soon as the group took down one, another would appear, as quickly as one per second in the hours after the shooting.”\textsuperscript{57} YouTube even disabled, for a brief time, several search functions to limit its reach, but some users had edited the original clips to avoid its automated detection systems.\textsuperscript{58}

Other social media platforms, like Reddit, worked to ban groups who had shared the video, as users reported seeing the content appear on WhatsApp.\textsuperscript{59} Reddit later banned the subreddit

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\textsuperscript{48} Tell MAMA (2019) ‘Brenton Tarrant: How the media helped turn the ‘shitposting’ terrorist into a meme’ March 15\textsuperscript{th} 2019 https://tellmama.uk/brenton-tarrant-how-the-media-helped-turn-the-shitposting-terrorist-into-a-meme/
\textsuperscript{49} Times of Israel (2019) ‘Facebook scrubs 1.5 million Christchurch attack videos, but criticism goes viral’ March 18\textsuperscript{th} 2019 https://www.timesofisrael.com/facebook-scrubs-1-5-million-christchurch-attack-videos-but-criticism-goes-viral/
\textsuperscript{57} CNET (2019) ‘How the New Zealand mosque shooting was designed to go viral’ March 21, 2019 https://www.cnet.com/news/how-the-new-zealand-mosque-shooting-was-designed-to-go-viral/
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
r/watchpeopledie as users were sharing or glorifying the terroristic content, actions that result in individual bans.60

Others gave social media platforms their free labour to manually report the video where they found it out an altruistic desire to reduce its reach and social harm.61

More broadly, academics have accused social media platforms of generating income from anti-Muslim and Islamophobic hate speech despite a continued crackdown on extremist content.62 A comparative analysis of ISIS and white nationalist activity on Twitter, published in September 2016 found that “American white nationalist movements have seen their followers grow by more than 600% since 2012. Today, they outperform ISIS in nearly every social metric, from follower counts to tweets per day.” 63

The advantage, the report argued was simple: Twitter was more willing to suspend pro-ISIS accounts, as ”The clear advantage enjoyed by white nationalists was attributable in part to the effects of aggressive suspensions of accounts associated with ISIS networks.”64 Journalists have contended that the manipulation of social media was “almost identical to how ISIS, at its peak, was using those very same platforms” as it was the first demonstrable example “of white nationalist extremism being treated — across these three big online platforms — with the same severity as pro-ISIS content” 65

Google, which owns the video-sharing platform YouTube, faced criticism after failing to remove videos which promoted the proscribed neo-Nazi terror group National Action despite assurances that it would be removed.66 Yvette Cooper MP, who chaired the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into the consequences of hate crime, had reported the same National Action propaganda video to YouTube eight times in 12 months, after noting it is continued reappearance, which the company blamed on ‘human error’ as its review team had erroneously decided against its removal.67

A subsequent investigation revealed that Google had informed moderators to flag all material related to Christchurch as terror-related due to the size of the screed document.68 A popular YouTuber, who built a large following through agriculture and DIY, used their platform, of over 600,000 subscribers to read Tarrant’s screed, which took YouTube over two days to remove. The video gained thousands of views as the content then appeared on other channels.69

64 Ibid.4.
The French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), announced in March that it would be suing Facebook and YouTube for allowing footage of the Christchurch to appear on their platforms, which the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand welcomed.

The UK media also faced a litany of criticism over its handling of the terror attacks in Christchurch, including the MailOnline which had inadvertently allowed readers to download Tarrant’s screed. Tabloids, including The Sun and The Mirror newspapers, ran excerpts of the live stream, forcing an apology from the latter. A report published by the Scottish Parliament’s Cross-Party Group on Tackling Islamophobia noted how the infamous Mirror front page which had, before revision, described the suspect as an “angelic boy” had sent “angry shockwaves throughout the Muslim community” as it was “an attempt to humanise the killer and ‘whitewash’ the incident”. Away from the UK, Sky New Zealand was fined NZ$4,000 (£2,100) for airing “extensive” footage of the Christchurch terror attack live streams, ruling that it “had the potential to cause significant distress to audiences in New Zealand, and particularly to the family and friends of victims, and the wider Muslim community”. It had emerged that the footage derived from a retransmission of a 24-hour news feed from a separate company, and was, as a result, removed from the platform.

Disregarding individual motivations, the online community showed enthusiasm or at least a great effort for locating and watching the live stream footage. The widespread access to violent imagery targeting Muslims has had a grave effect on people around the world, encouraging others to take their white supremacist and racist ideologies beyond social media and into real-world acts of terror and violence.

A 50-year-old British man, Vincent Fuller, watched the live stream of the Christchurch terror attack. The day after the attacks in Christchurch, he stabbed a Bulgarian teenager after roaming the streets searching for a target. Before the assault, he tried to force his way into the home of a South Asian family. Fuller hit random cars with a baseball bat and shouted: “All Muslims should die, white supremacists rule, I’m going to murder a Muslim”. He also posted on Facebook that agreed with “what that man did in New Zealand,” stating, “I am English, no matter what the government say kill all the non-English and get them all out of our of England.” His girlfriend told the police that, after seeing 51 Muslims had been murdered, Vincent had “got a bit angry” because “it is always them, the Muslims that get looked after and get cared about.” Fuller pled guilty to several charges. The police declared this to be a terrorist attack and the judge later announced this was “a terrorist act”, sentencing Fuller to 18 years and 9 months in prison.

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On 27 April 2019, an antisemitic mass shooting took place at Poway synagogue in California, which left one person dead and three others injured. The suspect, a 19-year-old man, also drew direct inspiration from Christchurch. His screed followed a similar pattern, appearing on 8chan before the attack occurred. It was in this racist screed that he boasted of his attempts to burn down a local mosque days after the deadly terror in New Zealand. The second source of inspiration was Robert Bowers, the white supremacist, accused of murdering 11 Jewish people at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in October 2018.

Also, in April, a computer game was launched which allowed users to re-enact the Christchurch terror attacks. The game claimed to portray ‘Jesus’ return to a post-apocalyptic world ravaged by radical socialism and religious fanatics’ who try to crucify him. The game has since been banned, and the Chief Censor of New Zealand, David Shanks, told the press: “We know that there are tools, widely available, to make these sorts of games very quickly and cheaply by enthusiasts. We also know these people have distribution platforms,” he told Newshub. The developers claimed the game was “family-friendly fun” and a “parody” that “does not advocate support or endorse any political group, ideology, movement, entity or individual(s).”

In August 2019, a 21-year-old white supremacist, intent on killing as many Latinx people as possible, carried out a mass shooting in El Paso, Texas, in a domestic terror attack which left 22 people dead and 26 others injured. The suspect, Patrick Crusius, singled out those he perceived as Latinx and avoided shooting those from other ethnic backgrounds. He also published his screed on 8chan before the attack, outlining his white nationalist ideology, motivated more broadly by the racist ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy. In the United States, this attack also prompted several copycat attempts, as law enforcement officials had thwarted at least seven mass shootings or white supremacist attacks in the two weeks which followed the terror attack in El Paso.

A week later, inspired by the terrorist shootings in El Paso and Christchurch, a 21-year-old white supremacist in Baerum, Norway broke into a mosque and opened fire, injuring one person. Prayers had just ended, so the hall was empty save for three men who apprehended the shooter. The suspect listed Brenton Tarrant as his inspiration had attempted to live stream the attack, and posted his intentions online before the attack. Philip Manshaus, 22, was charged with terrorism and the murder of his 17-year-old step-sister, Johanne Zhangjia Ihle-Hansen, killed because she is Asian.

There was, however, no evidence of a racist screed, nor use of either 4chan or 8chan, as misreported by sections of the media. A post attributed to Manshaus appeared on EndChan, which linked to the Facebook profile of Manshaus, and a photo album of him from youth to adulthood on the photo-sharing platform Imgur. A variant of the enduring “Chad vs Virgin” meme, which originated on 4Chan’s /r9k/ forum, was said to have been created by Manshaus in praise Brenton Tarrant. This version of the meme put himself and others, like Crusius, as his “disciples”, suggesting that one disciple begets the violent actions of the other. The meme also referenced the “great replacement” conspiracy and antisemitic

talking points referring to the terrorist violence of Anders Breivik. An Instagram account, attributed to Manshaus, featured just three photos; two of himself, and another of Anders Breivik performing a Nazi salute.

Similarly, while writing this report, a man in Halle, Germany attempted mass murder at a synagogue on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, and then drove to a kebab shop to attempt another shooting. Also mimicking Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator was live streaming, posted his screed online on KhoChan/EndChan, and was motivated by white supremacist ideologies. Moreover, two young men from Crawley and South Shields were both jailed in October 2019 for their extremist far-right activity online. Between March 16 and 19, the pair encouraged terrorist acts on a WhatsApp group called Christian White Militia. A month later, a teenage boy was convicted of planning far-right terror attacks in March, including plots to bomb a synagogue, and publishing a screed in the hope of inspiring further attacks such as those in Halle, El Paso, and Christchurch.

4.2.1.7 Summary: Recipe for Disaster

In each instance, young, white men were inspired and motivated online, by a conglomeration of far-right rhetoric including an unwavering hatred of Islam and Muslims. With latent racist and Islamophobic sentiments, the news of the terror attacks in Christchurch along with the subsequent dispersal of the suspect’s screed and live stream footage reinvigorated and emboldened people to act upon their prejudices. These incidents, and the ideologies behind them, are emblematic of the global rise in Islamophobic networks in mainstream and non-mainstream circles.

The symbolism presented by Brenton Tarrant portrays a mythologised version of European history, with countless references to European events and individuals, which has particularly appealed to people in the UK. Combined with his networking, the live stream, and his communications from prison, the intended impact is growing momentum. This is a form of ‘stochastic terrorism’, a series of what appear to be random, lone-wolf attacks with no identifiable central authority, but connected by a continuous thread of interlocking theories (e.g. outdated, falsified ‘race science’; the ‘great replacement theory’; ethnonationalism), heroes, memes, and message boards, which has repeatedly proven to have disastrous effects.

4.3 Far-Right Narratives, Dehumanisation and Terroristic Glorification: Online Responses to Christchurch

Tell MAMA recorded some extreme examples of dehumanising and violent forms of hate speech online in the immediate aftermath of the Christchurch terror attacks. A clear majority of which appeared within the first 24 to 48 hours but would deescalate in the days ahead, which echoes the research of Williams and Burnap (2015), who theorised that extreme forms of hate speech operate under a half-life which dissipates within 20 to 24 hours following the event, but the half-life of ‘moderate’ forms of

83 Ibid.
hate speech lingers for around 36 to 42 hours. Therefore, given the extreme nature of some of the comments reported, we categorised 80.9% of reports referencing Christchurch (n=42) as hate speech. The news media, as Cohen (2011) argues, is “the primary source of the public’s knowledge about deviance and social problems” and helps to frame the agenda, but within hours of the news breaking, the main suspect, Brenton Tarrant had been arrested and charged. Therefore, some of the social media commentaries from members of the public in the immediate aftermath were driven not by a desire to spread misinformation, but to lionise terrorist violence. Almost one-third of reports about Christchurch praised the event. Amid the absence of empathy was callous indifference or the glorification of violence. Examples ranged from statements about awarding medals to the suspect to more personalised forms of racialised gratitude, which referenced the “guy that shot up them *kis”. Silverstein posits that racialisation refers to the essentialised and biologised ways in which signs of social personhood, from class position to ethnicity, are relegated from fluid markers of difference into spaces of otherness. Those murdered in the terror attacks, however, were of various ethnicities, genders, and ages, including those who selflessly died to protect others, including 71-year-old Daoud Nabi, who ran the Afghan Association, had thrown himself in front of others when the gunman burst in, or 44-year-old Husna Ahmed, who fled the women’s section of the mosque to shield her wheelchair-bound husband during the attack. Others killed included the Syrian-born refugee Hamza Mustafa, 16, killed as he prayed next to his father. Linda Armstrong, 65, who converted to Islam in her 50s, was killed at the al-Noor mosque whereas Karam Bibi, 63, was killed with her husband Ghulam Husain, 66, and son Zeeshan Raza, 38, at the Linwood Islamic Centre. The following section will seek to interrogate how such ideas grow, as nothing, after all, exists in isolation. The comments, as our data reveals, were not isolated, despite their relatively small sample size. Removed from overt ideological drivers, as some accounts did not display overt racist or far-right views, leads us to look at attitudes towards Muslims and Islam in the UK more broadly.

Given that many will look to the news media for information, a factor that is likely to increase if individuals lack any social or familial bonds with Muslims, news framing matters if only to avoid othering, totalising, and ultimately, harmful narratives. The studies presented below are intended to be demonstrative, not exhaustive but showcase some fundamental fault lines in press coverage, but it also serves to tease out some of the nuances that relate to broader, structural problems in news values. It will then present a selection of data points from various opinion polls concerning public attitudes about Islam and Muslims. The hope, therefore, is to seek to understand how individuals, unconnected from each other, with no coherent ideology, express support for racist terror. To attempt to understand their rationale should not read as sympathy, as our analysis will include disturbing examples of hate speech, but we owe it to the victims and those affected, here and abroad, to better understand the drivers of such dehumanising malice, and, in some cases, calls for further violence. Tell MAMA, has, after all, recorded similar supportive statements of the Finsbury Park terrorist Darren Osborne in 2017, the difference, however, in this report, is of scale. Nor can we dismiss the role disinhibition (Suler 2004) plays online. Suler posits that online disinhibition affords individuals the ability to construct feedback loops or echo chambers to subvert traditional social norms in the absence of face-to-face interaction: meaning that some may act out their aggressive tendencies or true feelings

88 Ibid. 229.
92 Ibid.
online by creating ‘characters’ or more anonymised, extreme versions of themselves, without worrying about the potential consequences or harm their language causes. Such extreme behaviours, are of course, not always acted on in isolation, as social media platforms function as “techno-social” systems that work to constrain and enable human interactions as the social dimensions of social media usage, allows for a myriad of ways for information to be processed and interpreted. Socialisation online is not intrinsically a bad thing, as Wilkinson (2010) argued, as the internet creates spaces for community building, increases movements of solidarity, and bonds of kinship that have the potential to offer more collective and public forms of expression (a concept, however, she acknowledges is dependent on the merger of individualism into personal community spaces). Where as, Chambers (2013) argued that social media platforms provide “the technical affordances and the social possibilities for making the kinds of connections envisaged by ‘virtual communities’ and to enhance the social capital that lies within them”. For Boyd (2011), ‘networked publics’ have been groups which have been reorganised by technology, but crucially, do not dictate the behaviour of individuals. The danger, however, is how preexisting power dynamics are intensified and abused: from harassment, stalking, cyberbullying, to sexual or racist abuse, which, in effect, serve to mirror these preexisting social injustices and social inequalities. Moreover, the asynchronous nature of the internet allows for members of networked publics to be global in reach, as comments do not always occur in real-time, and as Suler argues, increasing the potential of disinhibition, as networks also create the potential for solipsistic introjection, which is a form of online theatre where the words of an online companion, real or self-designed, becomes a voice in the mind of that person.

Another important factor involves the nature of aversive racism, which, is defined as the subtler conflict between “the denial of personal prejudice and the underlying unconscious negative feelings and beliefs”. Moreover, aversive racists are more diffuse in their prejudices and characterised more by their anxieties and uneasiness, which is welded to a pro-in-group attitude that does not appear racist to the individual who holds it. If the media, therefore, works to ‘saturate’ political and everyday worlds (Neal 2003), negative and harmful representations can fuel or embolden racist and hateful attitudes. For example, depictions of black men in the 1970s and 1980s were criminalising, linking them to moral panics around crime and mugging (see Hall et al 1978, Gilroy 2013), as contradictory narratives about race through the lens of multiculturalism. Crucially, as Hall et al (1978), articulated, media representations exist within a framework of understanding centred around unconscious ‘maps’ which help form the basis of any cultural knowledge, and events like muggings, which did not conform to societal expectation, results in the press returning to mainstream institutions to reassert certain cultural imperatives. By applying this framework of analysis, we can, therefore, explore the role of

94 Ibid. 323.
100 Suler. The online disinhibition effect (2004). 323.
102 Ibid. 379.
the media in its framing of Muslims and Islam, noting further that readers are not merely passive consumers (see Hall 1973, McIlvenny 1996) but in terms of its linguistic framing. For example, in one corpus analysis which examined the top ten nouns used to describe Muslims and Islam in the British press between 1998 and 2009, concluded that Muslims went through a process of ‘othering’ as the terms perpetuated the idea of Muslims belonging to a ‘distinct and separate’ community, at odds with national and global communities. A different study, published by academics at Cardiff University in 2008, found that “Four of the five most common discourses used about Muslims in the British press associate Islam/Muslims with threats, problems or in opposition to dominant British values”. Rarely, had the news media linked Muslims to ‘dominate moral values’ as “references to radical Muslims outnumber references to moderate Muslims by 17 to one”. Other studies have drawn similar conclusions, if, albeit from smaller samples. Earlier scholarly work on the media representation of Muslims (vis-à-vis Islam) and other minorities highlights the corrosive effects of negative stereotypes (Poole 2002, Saha 2012). Nickels et al. (2012) analysed press coverage between 1974 and 2007 in a comparative analysis of how sections of the press framed Irish and Muslim communities as ‘suspect communities’, with Muslims presented symbolically as a threat to British values. The report concluded that the national press had a “strong tendency to represent Muslim communities as threatening perceived British values, with Irish communities tending to be represented as a threat to the British state”. The concept of a ‘suspect community’ relates to how a section of the population is “singled out for state attention as being ‘problematic’”, not for wrongdoing, but the presumption of belonging to that sub-group – race, religion, class, gender, or language (or a combination of). Bleich et al (2013), however, analysed 685 newspaper headlines between 2001 and 2012 across political spectrums (left/right) and publications (tabloid/broadsheet), and took a more nuanced position: that the British press was, in conclusion, not portraying Muslims in a uniformly negative manner, as “there were years where headline portrayals were net negative, but there were more years where they were net positive”. The paper offered several caveats; however, since the bigger-selling, right-leaning tabloids were more negative than left-leaning broadsheets, which, therefore, exposed a larger audience to negative headlines. Moreover, when the researchers compared the headlines to analogous faith groups (Christians and Jews), Muslims were ‘systematically’ portrayed more negatively. Researchers also analysed 8,486 Guardian newspaper headlines from 1985 to 2012, covering different faith groups – from Muslims to Christians to Jews and Hindus, and four years before the Rushdie Affair, Muslims were named in 3306 headlines – a far higher rate than any other faith group. Nor was this limited to

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111 Ibid.
116 Ibid. 147.
119 Ibid. 944.
120 Ibid. 944.
121 Ibid. 950.
one newspaper, as the search parameters expanded to analyse 11,838 headlines published in the Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail (and their Sunday equivalents) between 2001 and 2012, which revealed that 46% of headlines referenced Muslims or Islam, Christians, the next biggest faith group in the study, appeared in 18% of headlines. This timeframe is when discussions of Muslims in Western Europe framed around notions of ‘cultural outsiders’ where their Islamic faith was deemed a ‘barrier’ to inclusion. Other academics contend that is matters less about the volume of content, but rather how the tone of such content shapes the perceptions of out-groups.

Flood et. al (2012), however, analysed news coverage of Islam on three broadcast platforms in the UK, France, and Russia, analysing over 30,000 news items from November 2006 for two years. The study argued against a ‘uniformly’ Islamophobic broadcast media as it also rejected the idea that news bulletins bore no responsibility for anti-Muslim attitudes and sentiments. Richards and Brown (2017), made a similar argument, calling for a ‘proportionate response’ to Islamophobia in the media, instead, their focus concerned a central flaw in news values where “accounts of Muslims leading processes of reconciliation, liberalisation and political reform are rare”. Nevertheless, as Brown et al. (2014) noted, irrespective of the nature of media content, it will have consequences for Muslims, from their security to relations with other communities. To evidence the harm Islamophobia causes students, academics at Bournemouth University interviewed eighteen international students from a range of countries (including Turkey, Algeria, Lebanon, and Nigeria). During interviews, the topic of media representations of Islam and Muslims came up, to which, many replied that the framing was negative, and weighted towards coverage that emphasised conservatism, poverty, and terrorism. The negative coverage sometimes created feelings of anger and sadness amidst a broader sense of hostility towards them because of their Islamic faith, which some of the participants connected to their real-world experiences of Islamophobic abuse and violence. Moreover, students “saw little effort on the part of the media to balance the negative portrait of Islam that they help to build”. Similar arguments put forth by Morey and Yaqin explore how hostile attitudes owe to the slow drip of negative images in the press. As with the issue of media framing, it is important to gauge public opinion on Islam and Muslims, both in terms of public understanding of the religion and how other communities view Muslims within society. Again, we return to the question of the role the media plays in informing and shaping public opinion, as over half of the public learns about Muslims (and their faith) from the press, this figure rises higher still in the older generations (65% of those aged 55-64) and those who do not know any Muslims in their personal lives (67%). This low-level of knowledge about the fundamental tenets of Islam increases to 77% among those who know no Muslims in their social, familial, or professional lives. If there was a knowledge gap, the importance of media framing is not lost. For

122 Ibid. 950.
126 Ibid. 255.
130 Ibid. pp 19-22.
131 Ibid. 24.
134 Ibid. pp 77-78.
example, in the United States, research revealed that media outlets are almost four and a half times more likely to give coverage when the attacker was of a Muslim background, despite Muslims accounting for 12.4% of domestic terror attacks between 2011 and 2015.\textsuperscript{135} It is, therefore, no surprise that in a YouGov poll, conducted in 2015, found that a clear majority of those in the United States have no Muslim colleagues (74%), any Muslim friends (68%), or have visited a mosque (87%).\textsuperscript{136} Polling of Muslims and their lived experiences revealed that one in four had experienced discrimination, this became more acute amongst younger Muslims (notably those with graduate degrees) due to their ethnicity, faith, accent or language.\textsuperscript{137} A clear minority (9%) of discrimination cases cited in this poll concerned employment (within their workplace or when applying for jobs), four per cent when engaging with the criminal justice service, immigration services, or other governmental departments, with 3% of Muslims surveyed having reported discrimination in education.\textsuperscript{138} Furthermore, a clear majority of Muslims believe that the government treats them with fairness, but a sizeable minority believe that racial and religious discrimination harm their life chances,\textsuperscript{139} and in 2017, the Social Mobility Commission reported that young Muslims in the UK face enormous structural and discriminatory barriers in education and employment.\textsuperscript{140}

Switching to public perceptions of Islam, it can prove more broadly negative,\textsuperscript{141} a pattern which repeats in other parts of Europe,\textsuperscript{142} but those polled were less inclined to agree more broadly that Islam is a violent religion which promotes acts of violence in the UK.\textsuperscript{143} This tension between warmer feelings towards Muslim individuals but hostility to their Islamic faith also exists outside of the UK, as polls of people in Germany, France, and others found a near-even split on the question of Islam being compatible with their cultural values. For example, 44% of Germans saw a fundamental contradiction, as 46% did not.\textsuperscript{144} Similar numbers appeared in the UK polling result, but those of no faith were more likely than Christians (irrespective of their religiosity) to state that Islam was less incompatible with national values.\textsuperscript{145} Research from the Pew Research Center revealed that few Europeans have little or no knowledge of Islam or Judaism – almost three-quarters of Italians polled, for example, knew little or nothing about Islam, despite Muslims settling in Sicily and southern Italy between 800 and 1300.\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, Italy still does not officially recognise the Islamic faith, despite over one million Italians identifying as Muslim.\textsuperscript{147} Similarly, figures from the Netherlands and Spain reported high levels of ignorance about Islam, and, by extension, Judaism. Spain, of course, exiled its Jewish communities in 1492 and its Muslim communities following more than a century and discrimination and marginalisation.\textsuperscript{148} Both expulsions left a deep impression on the collective memory of both faith


\textsuperscript{136} ‘Poll Results: Islam’. YouGov. Available at: https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/03/09/poll-results-islam.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. pp-62-63.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. 63.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.64.


\textsuperscript{143} ComRes, Islamic Caliphate Survey,


\textsuperscript{146} Metcalf, Alex. Muslims of medieval Europe. Edinburgh University Press, 2009.


The Pew data, furthermore, found that the median score for little to no knowledge of Islam or Judaism across the sixteen Western European countries polled was 63% and 67% respectively. Conversely, a desire to learn more about Islam coincides with broader, more positive feelings towards Islam. Polls conducted in the UK have found that those who knew a Muslim person (either through work or social/familial ties) was less likely to agree that Islam was a negative force in the UK. A barrier, however, remains improving knowledge about Islam is in schools, as almost half (47%) of people polled disagreed that Islam should be taught more, as 38% agreed that it should (which increased amongst those who have Muslim friends, family, or acquaintances). If there was a reluctance to enhance the teaching of Islam (and by extension, other faiths) in schools, others are going further: exercising their right to remove their children from religious education (RE) lessons; a poll of teachers found that over 10% of withdrawals from the subject were racist or Islamophobic in nature. In one example, a teacher cited an example where parents had withdrawn their children from a visit to a mosque, believing that it would cause ‘irrecoverable harm’, as instead, they had to do a virtual tour of the mosque online when in school, this created sadness since they could not be with their friends. A similar example made headlines in 2015. Tell MAMA has also challenged viral news articles that concern homework assignments for children designed to demonstrate empathy and an understanding of Islam (as one of many religions in a structured curriculum of Religious Education), highlighting that some individuals who have taken stories to the press have displayed far-right or anti-Muslim and Islamophobic views online. Nor can we discount the role ideology plays, as Dr Chris Allen argues since it “is not the sole construct of the media”. Furthermore, he argues, ideologies can be reinforced through messages and meanings in social, political, and cultural spaces, via individual or collective interactions, and ideas embedded in the fabric of history. Furthermore, Fields & Fields (2012) argue that ideology functions in a ritualistic, performative manner, which, to survive, it must find verification and creation in social life which is then ‘embodied’ and distributed. Whereas to engage in digital cultures more broadly in ways that are harmful, transgressive, and offensive are, as Fielitz and Marcks (2019), argue, function to assert collective identity over ideological consistency. Moreover, echo chambers facilitate homogenous, discursive spaces where certain popularised content goes unchallenged and marginalises other content in the pursuit of clicks, which, in broader cultural terms, risks cultivating a form of thinking that is distorted or makes individuals suspicious of content that exists outside of these echo

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151 Pew Research Center. "Being Christian in Western Europe."
152 Chalabi, M. 'Americans Are More Likely To Like Muslims If They Know One'. FiveThirtyEight. Available at: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-are-more-likely-to-like-muslims-if-they-know-one/.
154 Ibid.
160 Ibid. 5.
163 Ibid. 14.
chambers.\textsuperscript{164} Barberá (2014), however, argues that social media can work to puncture solipsistic echo chambers, since the diversification of Twitter networks, for example, can help to moderate the heterogeneity of personal social networks.\textsuperscript{165}

The strength of ideological thinking had celebrated the terror in Christchurch, glorified the terrorist, and called for the genocide of Muslims, stood out when analysing and verifying reports to Tell MAMA in this reporting cycle. This again demonstrates the power of dehumanising language, where the oppressors view their targets as literal subhuman forms\textsuperscript{166} which, in turn, help facilitate the conditions for group-based violence. Examples verified by Tell MAMA included statements like, “The man in New Zealand is a hero in my eyes, eradicate the dirty Muslim religion” and a social media post which referred to Islam as a ‘racist killing cult’ which should be wiped ‘off the planet’. Such glorification of far-right terrorism, a trend intensified following the Finsbury Park attack in 2017, could fall foul of the Terrorism Act 2006.\textsuperscript{167}

Such acts of “othering” Muslims as culturally inferior is nothing new, and historically, served to justify colonial expansion, and fused with the racial pseudo-science which gained mainstream prominence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{168} Historians have challenged such simplistic and caustic narratives, writing for Time Magazine, Dan Jones argued that such framing served “to perpetuate an idea of the crusades that are binary and zero-sum: an us-or-them narrative designed to justify hatred, racist vitriol, violence and even murder”.\textsuperscript{169} Adding that: “The medieval crusades were a largely dreadful misdirection of religious enthusiasm towards painful and bloody ends. They were neither a glorious clash of civilizations nor a model for the world as it is today”. This undercurrent of pessimism also bleeds into fatalism, as some sections of the far-right speak of violent civil war with Muslims as a logical outcome that requires preparation. This violent rhetoric can and does lead to street-level violence. Turner (1995), for example, argued that acts of racist violence are acts of inclusion for perpetrators,\textsuperscript{170} which Silverstein (2008) applied to their argument concerning how white Frenchman (often unemployed) used violence to ‘re-insert’ themselves into society under the auspices of ‘ideological defenders’ of the racialised ideal of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{171}

Some comments came from individuals with overt far-right views, and in another example, a woman in the Lancashire area wrote on Facebook (as part of a more extensive discussion), began her screed with the comment “F*ck Islam” and morphed into: “Also Islam isn't a person, so its feeling can't get hurt get a grip of yourself you whimp. Islam is a violent set of beliefs mascarading as a religion”. A further investigation of their Facebook profile revealed one public post which took a screenshot of a news article from Breitbart, which has been identified by the UK Government’s Rapid Response Unit (RRU), which works to counter fake news and misinformation, as an “alt-news outlet” with a global audience.\textsuperscript{172} Facebook has faced criticism for including Breitbart in its list of ‘high quality’ news

\textsuperscript{165} Barberá, Pablo. "How social media reduces mass political polarization. Evidence from Germany, Spain, and the US." Job Market Paper, New York University 46 (2014).
\textsuperscript{168} Konrad, Felix. "From the" Turkish Menace" to Exoticism and Orientalism: Islam as Antithesis of Europe (1453–1914)." European History Online (2011).
outlets. The Facebook post, however, posted in May, used the hashtags “#RamadanBombathon” and “#TheReligionOfPeace”. Months earlier, the user had shared a post from their father which praised the infamous British fascist Oswald Mosley. The caption read: “My dad gets it 🇬🇧 take our country back, drive out Islam and anyone that wants it, or defends it!”.

Other comments displayed a concerning level of victim-blaming which, upon further analysis, appeared in one-quarter (n=10) of online reports following the immediate aftermath of Christchurch. Comments included, “Oh how the tables have turned, how does it feel being on the receiving end”, “Muslims will finally understand now, Karma”, and “Muslims blow up our children and families...i ain’t upset with someone finally doing it to them, will they understand Karma now...”.

Moreover, in one example of victim-blaming, the person displayed a higher level of sympathy for the suspect Brenton Tarrant, not the 51 Muslims murdered, writing that, “He’s as fed up as we all are”, adding that he had “only done what many of us wish to do”. This view, however, is not unheard of, as Comstock (1991) observed how, in some situations, perpetrators find their behaviours and actions excused as victims are demeaned and blamed. Consequently, some scholars have documented the broader societal sympathy for those who commit anti-LGBT hate crimes. Conversely, a distorted worldview means that perpetrators justify their actions because the out-group was ‘deserving’ of violence, or, the perpetrator reframes their actions, shifting the blame on the victim. Whereas there was less comparative evidence of victim-blaming for those who experience racist hate crime, but in the justice system, one study found that participants favoured harsher sentences for black perpetrators who targeted white individuals than for white individuals who targeted black individuals, in mock trials using vignette descriptions of violence. Furthermore, dehumanisation and victim-blaming are not mutually exclusive concepts, as Smiley and Fakunle (2016), analysed how media framing undermined the personhood of innocent black men and children killed by law enforcement officers in the United States, in news articles which relied upon criminalising narratives to shift blame away from the perpetrators.

Moreover, drawing on the works of Sue et. Al (2007), micro-insults (defined as subtle forms of communication, whether verbal or non-verbal, which demean an individual’s racial identity) and micro-invalidations (defined as subtle forms of communication which work to minimise, exclude, feelings and lived experiences of people of colour), help to “marginalize and de-victimize these individuals”.

Previous Tell MAMA reports have analysed the negative consequences of the ‘bystander effect’ in incidents of offline anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia, but the broad psychology of it, as defined by Rigby (1996), shows how young people are not immune, even though they are likely to report anti-

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183 Smiley, CalvinJohn, and David Fakunle. 2016.
bullying attitudes. The research found a split on gender (as girls tended to more supportive of victims), but when trends amongst age groups were considered and controlled for older teenagers, sympathy for victims of bullying decreased, particularly amongst boys, despite even older teens identifying with the victims.\textsuperscript{184} Comparatively, Schuster (2001), argued that bias amongst children leaned towards victim-blaming, especially when they become aware of previous examples of victimisation.\textsuperscript{185} Passivity, after witnessing an act of exclusion can, in some examples, create unfavourable sentiments,\textsuperscript{186} and in the examples listed above, we must consider how the gamification of hatred, can further tilt online discussions to toxic, dehumanising, and violent rhetoric.

It remains clear, however, that the above examples satisfy not just microaggressions, micro-insults, micro-invalidations, but extend to microassaults (defined as an often overt form of verbal or non-verbal attack design to cause harm through name-calling, avoidant behaviour, or discriminatory action),\textsuperscript{187} include the verified reports which called for additional group-based violence and genocide against Muslim communities and their religious institutions. Moreover, a further example, directed at a user who condemned the terror attacks and Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, received this reply: “Tommy just speaks what most Brits think. The sleeping giant is waking...”. Twitter did not remove this example. Again, it is worth stressing that many of the most violently dehumanising comments appeared on Facebook, not Twitter, with the latter having redefined its hateful conduct policy. Twitter stated in July 2019 that: “We prohibit targeting individuals with repeated slurs, tropes or other content that intends to dehumanise, degrade or reinforce negative or harmful stereotypes about a protected category”.\textsuperscript{188} With a justified focus on dehumanising language which targets religious groups, it provided the following example of ‘animalistic dehumanising speech’ which had referred to a faith group as maggots and having argued for their removal.\textsuperscript{189} This welcome change is still not without issue, as demonstrated above. Twitter, did, however, remove a comment that read: “Oh dear what rubbish you find in the Guardian. NZ was an answer to the massacre of an innocent Swedish girl and the raping of so many at Rotherham by members of the Religion of Peace”.

This tweet references two events which appear in the screed of Brenton Tarrant. Concerning the former, it refers to the murder of 11-year-old Ebba Åkerlund, killed alongside Marie Kide, 66, Lena Wahlberg, 69, Belgian national Mailyse Dereymaeker, 39, and 41-year-old Chris Bevington, a British national, in a terrorist attack in Stockholm, Sweden, in April 2017.\textsuperscript{190} The killer, Rakhmat Akilov, a failed

\textsuperscript{187} Sue et al., 2007. 274.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
Uzbek asylum seeker, whom friends described him as non-religious, apolitical, and someone ‘who partied and drank’,\footnote{BBC News. "Rakhmat Akilov: Stockholm Truck Attacker." BBC News. Last modified June 7, 2018. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39552691.} was given a life sentence.\footnote{Ibid.} Despite claiming it was an IS-inspired attack, the terror group did not claim responsibility.

More broadly, academics like Horsti (2017), argued that Islamophobic and far-right echo chambers take crimes, like sexual assault and rape, to mythologise all Muslim men as a threat, as it also weaponises a form of ‘feminine whiteness’ which is constructed as the victim of racialised Muslim male violence and liberal feminism.\footnote{Horsti, Karina. "Digital Islamophobia: The Swedish woman as a figure of pure and dangerous whiteness." New Media & Society 19, no. 9 (2017): 1440-1457.} Crucially, the power of such imagery is in its interpretation, as it broaches upon “privileged whiteness, cultural and biological forms of racism, as well as anti-feminism”.\footnote{Ibid. 14.} This creates an online space which reaffirms their transnational Islamophobic ties and allows individuals to performatively express their ideologies, anxieties, and identities, against a backdrop of paranoid, fatalistic fantasies of impending doom and civil war.\footnote{Ibid. 14.} Studies of official crime data in Sweden have also confirmed that rises in reports of rape and sexual assault are not about refugee arrivals, countering the racialised falsehoods put out by the likes of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump,\footnote{BBC News. "Is Malmo the ‘rape Capital’ of Europe?" BBC News. Last modified February 24, 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39056786.} as the country has broadened its legal definitions of such crimes (hence the spike in 2005), and often, perpetrators are known to the victim (as with the majority of related crimes), amid growing societal awareness around the importance of consent.\footnote{The Local Sweden. "New Crime Study: Rise in Sweden’s Rape Stats Can’t Be Tied to Refugee Influx." The Local - Sweden's News in English. Last modified May 29, 2019. https://www.thelocal.se/20190529/increase-in-swedens-rape-statistics-cant-be-tied-to-refugee-influx-study-suggests.}

Tell MAMA, has, for many years, in news articles and reports, showing how the UK far-right have exploited criminal acts of sexual exploitation to further anti-Muslim hate and racialised narratives which harm Muslims more broadly, a view shared by academics,\footnote{Cockbain, Ella. Offender and victim networks in human trafficking. Routledge, 2018.} who have argued that confirmation bias might attract greater media coverage for one type of offence category, adding to a public perception that such crimes are racially-motivated.\footnote{Cockbain, Ella. "Grooming and the ‘Asian sex gang predator’: the construction of a racial crime threat." Race & Class 54, no. 4 (2013): 29.}

In an earlier and equally important parallel, Warner (2004), analysed the racialised ‘moral panics’ around rape and the supposed ‘cultural menace’ of Lebanese-Australian men were linked to broader inflammatory discussions around immigration and terrorism in popular political discourse.\footnote{Warner, Kate. "Gang rape in Sydney: Crime, the media, politics, race and sentencing." Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 37, no. 3 (2004): 344-361.} Moreover, this framing also fuelled an Islamophobic backlash and criminalised communities, due to the use of ethnic descriptors which put the onus on community members to condemn the crimes, amid broader claims of Lebanese and Muslim cultural problems to address.\footnote{Ibid. 352.} Ho (2007) argued that such crimes, and the subsequent debates in Australia, had “bolstered the image of Muslim men’s ‘bad attitudes’ toward women, and have stimulated a racialised urge to protect ‘our women’.”\footnote{Ho, Christina. "Muslim women’s new defenders: Women’s rights, nationalism and Islamophobia in contemporary Australia." In Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 290-298. Pergamon, 2007.}
Judge Latham denied that the crimes were racially-motivated, despite suggestions and editorial claims in sections of the media, but, instead, were driven by a ‘pack mentality and opportunism’. Writing for the Guardian newspaper in 2002, David Fickling noted how one right-wing radio presenter, Alan Jones, spoke of “Muslim rapes of Australian women” and how it supposedly indicated an “Islamic hatred towards the community that welcomed them”. Furthermore, the Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales warned that public responses to media-driven moral panics were legitimising or fuelling “political leaders and the media themselves pushing for harsher law and order legislation or policies under the banner of community safety.” Given the media saturation, little coverage, however, was given to the anti-Muslim and Islamophobic backlash, which included the rape of an 18-year-old Muslim woman, threats of further sexual violence, including to students at an Islamic school in Sydney, as others reported assaults against Muslim women.

The terror attacks in Christchurch inspired a wave of far-right and racist violence in England, Norway, and parts of the United States, but in the online world, some spoke of imitating Christchurch. On April 11, local press confirmed that Morgan Seales, 19, had been charged with seven offences under Section 58 of the Terrorism Act following his arrest along with another man, identified a day later as 26-year-old Gabriele Longo, on March 27. Both men were accused and then convicted of publishing statements encouraging terrorism in a far-right WhatsApp group called the Christian White Militia group. Seales, who had since turned twenty following his arrest, was given a six-year prison sentence, as Longo received a four-year prison sentence. Following their trial at Leeds Crown Court, it emerged that counter-terror police had arrested Seales soon after the terror attacks in Christchurch, due to their suspicious online activity, and Longo was arrested a month later after police investigated Seales’s phone records and connected the pair. Both were found guilty of various terror-related offences. Judge Tom Bayliss QC said: “Both of you were in danger of indoctrinating others in that group chat”, adding the youngest members were 14-years-old. A Tell MAMA investigation for this report uncovered an account from Morgan Seales which had shared anti-Muslim and Islamophobic memes in 2016 when he was around 16 or 17. One text-based meme linked Muslims to terrorism and was posted in March of that year, whereas, in December, he shared a far-right meme that invoked the Knights Templar and the Crusades, which represents the sharp edge of a broader radical and far-right historiography of Europe. This taps into a ‘chauvinistic form of identity politics’ which are tied to ‘group-specific memories’ that are never fully addressed but remain spoke of in the prevailing ideological echo chambers. Moreover, the personalisation and moralisation of politics and critique, as Salzborn (2017), argues, helps to blur the lines between abstract structures and real events.

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212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
intensification of emotion, which, when fused with the power of myth-making and a broader cultural pessimism, helps to identify the digital pathways which connect disparate far-right groups (and individuals) with outright fascists, which Fielitz and Holger (2019) correctly identify, is of paramount importance. Online fascism, is, after all, equally driven by a sense of victimhood, which Paxton (2004) identified as a core ideological tenet, given its "obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity". In broader and mainstream politics, however, academics like Johnson (2017), argue that a defining feature of the Trump campaign in 2016 was its reliance on 'white victimised toxic masculinity'. By imagining themselves as either 'disrespected or violated by the political establishment,' many supporters could ignore and disavow their societal privileges by centring their sense of discomfort as 'proof' of their apparent exclusion from politics.

The prevalence of “stigmatised knowledge”, and the ease in which conspiracy theories reduce complexities to binaries, equally find validation in online spaces where alternative forms of 'truth' thrive outside of mainstream institutions, which are considered corrupt or untrustworthy, has helped to create self-styled Islamophobic influencers online, who misuse the conventions of journalism to target minority communities. Recent examples of such information having violent, real-world consequences occurred in France, as a pensioner attempted to bomb a mosque, driven by a far-right conspiracy that Muslims had attempted to burn down the Notre Dame Cathedral. In the post-Christchurch climate, Greater Manchester Police arrested 11 people for Islamophobic hate crimes, with a majority of such offences being committed online.

Whereas abroad, Canadian authorities investigated two prominent neo-Nazis, for allegedly posting the screed online, as the other, identified as Kevin Goudreau, faced accusations of attempting to incite similar terrorist violence in Canada. Facebook later banned several white nationalist and far-right Facebook pages linked to Goudreau and others, including that of Faith Goldy.

As discussed earlier in the report, Vincent Fuller, the white supremacist terrorist, had watched the Christchurch terror videos online. Guy Rosen, Vice President of Integrity at Facebook, confirmed that between the day of the terror attacks (March 15) and September 30, 4.5 million posts, with 97% of content removed without reporting from users, including news articles and content which would otherwise not breach the platform’s Code of Conduct, out of respect for those affected.

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216 Fielitz, Maik, and Holger Marcks, 2019. 9.
219 Ibid. 11.
221 Ibid. 7.
The primary ideological influence of the screed is known more broadly as the “Great Replacement” which ratchets up the racialised conspiratorial idea of declining birth rates among white women in Europe, and catastrophises that a decline will propel Europe towards a cultural reckoning, where minority communities become the dominant feature through demographical shifts. The individual credited with popularising this conspiracy is Renaud Camus - a product of the Nouvelle Droite or the New Right movement in France - whom some describe as the embodiment of the “profound cultural shift in which Europe has abandoned its postwar creed of tolerance for identitarian anger.” Camus has had legal troubles before, notably for his Islamophobic comments in 2015 (but avoided prison on appeal), and for his broad support of the far-right in France. Nor is he the only French intellectual to promote such incendiary and racialised conspiracies. History also shows that this form of thinking was at the heart of French political life, as Charles de Gaulle, who oversaw the end of oppressive and violent French colonial rule in Algeria, confided in 1959, of his fears of turning France into an ‘Islamic country’ if full citizenship was to be offered, concluding: “My village would no longer be called Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises, but Colombey-Les-Deux-Mosquées!”

The other source of ideological inspiration present in the screed is Identitarianism which favours a “mediatised form of intellectual activism aimed at shaping ideas through media, expressive culture, and online propaganda.” The ideology places heavy emphasis on ethnopluralism – a racialised belief in the separation of cultures, which in reality, is the New Right’s counterpoint to pluralism and multiculturalism, which favours the enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities, to avoid ‘cultural genocide’. The influence of ethnopluralism, the Italian and French New Right, has been a blueprint for various extreme right-wing movements in Europe, and have been a significant influence on the

Russian ethnonationalist ideologue and philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. Moreover, Dugin sought to merge radical, fascistic nationalism with conservative politics that offered a middle (or third-way) ground between capitalism and communism, or, as others contend, is merely a form of revolutionary fascism centred around Russia, grounded in ethnonationalist illiberal politics, that seeks out empire but fears anything outside of monoculturalism.

The proximity between Tarrant and the ideology of Identarianism was transactional – he donated €1,500 to Martin Sellner’s organisation. Correspondence between the men would include the mutual offer of drinks or coffee together if either man travelled to Austria, New Zealand, or Australia. Austrian police then launched a counter-terror investigation into Sellner’s connections to Tarrant. Further investigations of Tarrant’s social media activity detailed his support for the Australian “eco-fascist” Marcus Christensen, who supports the white nationalist Lads Society movement, but denies holding such views. Tarrant had left several positive reviews for his machinist business.

On March 25, 2019, Prime Minister Jacinda Arden announced a Royal Commission inquiry into the Christchurch terror attacks. It has, however, been mired in controversy, as many Muslims feel ignored and marginalized by its secrecy. Aliya Danzeisen, of the Islamic Women’s Council, said they were being “ignored”. New Zealand’s Human Rights Commissioner called for the increased inclusion of Muslims in the inquiry in July 2019.

This has brought renewed scrutiny about how the police and security services dealt with the threat of far-right extremism and violence. In hundreds of pages of evidence, submitted to the Royal Commission, the Islamic Women’s Council stated that the public sector had “dramatically failed to protect the Muslim community”.

Frances Joychild QC, who collated their submission to the Royal Commission, told Radio New Zealand: “While the women strived to prevent local Muslims from becoming radicalised and to protect their community from the consequences of growing Islamophobia and alt-right activity, the efforts from the government amounted to little more than box-ticking.”

244 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
5 METHODOLOGY

Tell MAMA classifies an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic incident as any malicious act aimed at Muslim groups or individuals, private property, or Islamic organisations, where the act has biased motivation or content, or that the victim was targeted due to their being (or perceived as) Muslim. The two terms, anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia, are used interchangeably and have the same meaning. As with any other form of hate crime, the victim does not have to be Muslim to experience such prejudice or violence, as the racialised nature of this prejudice means that non-Muslims experience abuse. We also challenge any rhetoric which informs and inspires cycles of anti-Muslim hatred, discrimination, and racism. Similarly, where members of Muslim communities promote prejudice themselves, we also challenge these narratives and any behaviours related to them.

Tell MAMA is primarily a service for victim support, its secondary function is research and the monitoring of anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia nationally. When we receive a report of anti-Muslim hatred, our team follows up with the victim and log the case details in a database. Our research team then use these to analyse trends, monitor news coverage and create reports. Tell MAMA does not actively search for incidents; the incidents in this report are only those which have been reported by victims and witnesses.

Alongside the quantitative analysis, most of this report is based on a qualitative thematic analysis of case notes including reports from members of the public, referrals from third-party organisations, and occasionally news articles. The case notes of the incidents reported to us during the year were analysed by our research team and used to form this academic study. There are, however, methodological issues associated with the use of reports or incident data. For one, many incidents go unreported for a variety of reasons, for example, for fear or anxiety about speaking out, mistrust of authorities, or a lack of knowledge of support services such as Tell MAMA. Furthermore, we organise cases by specific categories, such as location, incident type, victim and perpetrator characteristics, keywords, and more, however, the availability of some information depends on what the source is able or willing to disclose, and whether the victims have consented to this information being included in our reports. While this produces some gaps in our data, we prioritise victims and their confidentiality.

It is crucial to the fight against anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia that priority is given to the views and voices of Muslims. Within our analysis, we rely heavily on the testimony of victims or witnesses. All eyewitness testimony is based on the perspective of the person reporting to our service and is redacted where necessary to protect their identities. Our focus, however, is on supporting our service users, making their voice heard, and using first-hand accounts of their experiences to show how low-level prejudice and racism affects their daily lives, ultimately, to prevent anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia.

Tell MAMA, whilst retaining its independence, also works in partnership with police forces, sharing best practices and advocating on behalf of Muslim communities. In this report, we will incorporate data from twenty police forces across the UK to observe broader trends in anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia. Furthermore, when combined, cases from Tell MAMA’s data which have also been reported to the police are removed to prevent duplicated figures.

Notes on our categories

How we categorise incidents has altered slightly since Tell MAMA was founded. We review our database criteria regularly and make changes responding to trends in the reports received. For example, toward the latter half of 2016, we introduced a separate category for ‘hate speech’, where previously these incidents would have fallen more broadly within ‘abusive behaviour’ or ‘anti-Muslim literature’ – this
was introduced in online categories shortly afterwards. This gives us greater capacity to analyse and compare trends in Islamophobia. The details of our place and incident categories for this reporting period are detailed below.

Definitions of Street-Based (Offline) Place Categories

- ‘Public Area’ – An incident that occurs in public, pedestrianised areas, including town centres, parks, or shopping areas.
- ‘Transport Networks’ – An incident that occurs on public transport networks, including railways, buses, coaches, trams, the London Underground and stations more generally.
- ‘Place of Business’ – An incident that occurs in a shop, restaurant or other privately-owned business where the victim does not work.
- ‘Household or Private Property’ – An incident that occurs in or around the victim’s or another person’s domestic dwelling.
- ‘Place of Work’ – An incident that occurs in the victim’s workplace, including public spaces if the victim is a taxi driver or police officer, for example.
- ‘Educational Institution’ – An incident that occurs within a college, school or university that the victim attends.
- ‘Road or Highway’ – An incident involving one or more vehicles on a roadway or car park.
- ‘Muslim Institutions’ – An incident targeting an Islamic institution such as a mosque, cemetery, cultural centre or Islamic school.
- ‘Public Institution’ – An incident that occurs within a public building, such as a job-centre or council office where the victim does not work.
- ‘Hospital’ – An incident that occurs in health service buildings including hospitals, GP surgeries or health clinics.

Clarifications

Tell MAMA has often used ‘street-based’ to refer more broadly to all offline incidents, while this shorthand is useful for observing trends between offline and online spheres, it is important to note that not all ‘street-based’ incidents occur on roads and pavements, but in the multiplicity of places listed above. Furthermore, the place category is chosen based upon the victim’s position to the location, when the victim’s place of work also refers to another category, e.g. hospital or educational institution, we record this as a place of work. Incidents occurring in airports, ports, and stations are recorded as transport networks.

Definitions of Street-Based (Offline) Incident Categories

- ‘Abusive Behaviour’ – Verbal and non-verbal abuse including comments or gestures targeting an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity or beliefs.
- ‘Assault’ – A physical attack ranging from unwanted touching, spitting, or throwing objects, to a violent assault against an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity. This has been named as ‘Physical Attack’ in previous reports.
- ‘Threatening Behaviour’ – Direct and indirect threats of harm or violence motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice.
- ‘Discrimination’ – Denial of access or unfair treatment in a wide range of settings due to a perception of Muslim identity or beliefs.
- ‘Vandalism’ – Damage or desecration of property motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice which includes anti-Muslim graffiti, damage to property, or the dumping of pork products or alcohol.
• ‘Anti-Muslim Literature’ – Written or visual anti-Muslim content including letters, leaflets, memes or posters publicly displayed or distributed to individuals.

• ‘Hate Speech’ – Verbal communication, often but not exclusively delivered to an audience, with the intent to stir up violence, racism, or acts of discrimination.

Anti-Muslim attacks often include multiple types of abuse. Most commonly, a victim may experience verbal abusive behaviour accompanying threatening behaviour and/or a physical attack (recorded as ‘assault’). In cases involving multiple types of abuse, we would categorise the incident based on the most prominent or most serious component of the attack according to the victim’s testimony. For example, a case reported to us in 2019 involved two men shouting “f***ing Arab” at a Muslim woman in the street, then following her to her house, and spitting on her clothes. This incident includes abusive behaviour, threatening behaviour and assault, and was therefore classified as the most severe action, assault.

Definitions of Online Incident Categories

• ‘Abusive behaviour’ – Verbal and non-verbal abuse including comments or gestures targeting an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity or beliefs.

• ‘Threatening behaviour’ – Direct and indirect threats of harm or violence motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice.

• ‘Hate Speech’ – Verbal communication, often non-targeted, delivered to an audience to spread racial hatred, incitement to violence, and broadly promote dehumanising and degrading stereotypes about Muslims and their Islamic faith.

Definitions of Online Place Categories

• ‘Facebook’ – Incidents occurring on the Facebook website, including private messages, statuses, comments, and posts in groups.

• ‘Twitter’ – Incidents occurring on the Twitter website, including Tweets, private messages, and comments.

• ‘YouTube’ – Incidents occurring on the YouTube website, including videos, comments, and video descriptions.

• ‘Other’ – Incidents occurring elsewhere online, including Instagram, WhatsApp, emails, Snapchat, and message boards.

During this reporting period, 1,100 people contacted Tell MAMA with concerns or anxieties around anti-Muslim prejudice, inquiries about safety measures, or seeking advice. Many of these involved reports of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic incidents.

Between January and June 2019, Tell MAMA recorded 705 incidents, of which, 529 were verified. For a report to be ‘verified’, we assess the motivations and nature of the incident, we then verify that the incident took place in the UK, and then check the date of the incident compared with when it was reported, thus some of the incidents reported to us in 2019 may have occurred in 2018 and are excluded from this analysis. Similarly, some incidents occurring in the first half of 2019 may be reported to us after this report is completed. As a result, the data in this report may differ slightly from previous and future data published by Tell MAMA.

While the nature of hate crime reporting leaves some details omitted, we do our best to acquire an accurate picture of the timescale of anti-Muslim incidents. The next sections provide a more detailed summary along with our thematic evaluation of these cases.
6 INCIDENTS REPORTED TO TELL MAMA: JANUARY — JUNE 2019

Between January 1 and June 30, 2019, Tell MAMA was approached by 1,100 people. We recorded 705 incidents, of which, 529 were verified as anti-Muslim and Islamophobic in nature.

As usual, the majority of incidents occur offline, with 29% taking place online.

6.1 STREET-BASED (OFFLINE) TELL MAMA DATA

During this reporting period Tell MAMA recorded 516 incidents, of which 374 were verified.

One event dominates the dataset during this reporting period. A month-by-month timeline shows a significant spike occurring in March, the month of the terror attack on two mosques in Christchurch.

The incident categories show abusive behaviour as the most common (N=159), followed by discrimination (N=56), assault (N=50), and vandalism (N=47).
The place categories show that, most commonly, anti-Muslim incidents took place in a public area (N=98), followed by the victim’s household or private property (N=62) and place of work (N=37).
The following graph shows the frequency of incidents by their category and where they took place.

As usual, the most common typology is abusive behaviour in a public area (N=43 out of 374). Incidents marked as abusive behaviour often involve verbal abuse, for example, a mother was in a local park with her young child and baby when a group of men shouted “P*ki” and “you shouldn’t be in our country” at them.

The second most common incident was abusive behaviour taking place at the victim’s household or other private property (N=27). A high proportion of these incidents are long-term cases, involving a series of incidents perpetrated by neighbours. Other reports of abusive behaviour at home included pork products being left outside of a house, pages from the Quran torn up and thrown into a garden, and a landlord targeting tenants with abusive language.
6.2 **Online Tell MAMA Data**

During this reporting period Tell MAMA recorded 185 online incidents, of which 84% were verified. The majority of online incidents were categorised as hate speech (N=97), more than twice the rates of abusive behaviour (N=33) and anti-Muslim literature (N=22).

Due to the nature of hate speech as a typology, being that which promotes or celebrates hatred, many hate speech incidents related to the Christchurch terror attacks - 80.9% of reports referencing Christchurch (n=42) were categorised as hate speech. Whereas, incidents categorised as abusive behaviour often target an individual with abusive language or imagery.

The following graph shows the online platforms where the incidents took place. Most commonly, anti-Muslim incidents occurred on Twitter (N=66), with Facebook comprising roughly one-third of the incidents (N=55). The ‘other’ category includes, for example, Instagram, Snapchat, emails, and WhatsApp.
In comparing the platform and categories, the most commonly occurring incident took place on Facebook and was categorised as hate speech (N=42), closely followed by hate speech on Twitter (N=39). Twitter also accounted for higher rates of abusive behaviour (N=15) and anti-Muslim literature (N=10) than Facebook (N=8 and N=5 respectively).
7 Interpreting Police Data with Tell MAMA Data

Tell MAMA works in partnership with police forces across the UK. For this reporting period, we have received anti-Muslim data from the following 20 regions:

- Bedfordshire
- British Transport Police
- Cambridgeshire
- Cheshire
- City of London
- Derbyshire
- Dorset
- Greater Manchester
- Hampshire
- Humberside
- Kent
- Metropolitan (London)
- Northamptonshire
- Northern Ireland
- Staffordshire
- South Yorkshire
- Warwickshire
- West Mercia
- West Midlands
- Merseyside
- Lancashire

It should be noted that this report is missing data from West Midlands, Merseyside, and Lancashire, these three regions typically have high levels of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic incidents. Furthermore, to avoid duplicates, the police data presented here does not include cases from the Tell MAMA data which have been reported to the police.

In total, between January and June 2019 the police recorded 1,213 anti-Muslim incidents. Of these, 85% occurred offline, while 7% were online, and, for 8%, the nature of the incident is unknown.

Consistent with Tell MAMA’s data, the timeline of police reports shows a significant spike occurring in March. This timeline differs in the comparably higher rates of incidents in police data during the following months.

Where information was available, we coded the incident categories according to the same rubric as Tell MAMA.

The most common incident category for offline cases was abusive behaviour (N=459), followed by assault (N=239), and threatening behaviour (108). Of the online cases, the most common incident category was also abusive behaviour (N=38), followed by threatening behaviour (N=16) and hate speech (N=15).

Most commonly, offline anti-Muslim incidents took place in public areas (N=237), households or private property (N=164), and transport networks (N=133).
To look more closely at which types of incidents are more often reported to the police, comparing percentages of the total dataset it useful. For example, abusive behaviour (offline) comprised 35% of the police incidents and 43% of Tell MAMA’s incidents. A more significant difference was assault (offline), which comprised 20% of police data and 13% of Tell MAMA’s dataset. Furthermore, discrimination (offline) comprised 15% of Tell MAMA data, but only 1% of police data. This highlights the types of anti-Muslim incidents which are most likely to be reported to the police, and which are more often brought to Tell MAMA.

The following charts compare the proportions of incident typologies between Tell MAMA and police force data.

The highest rate of online incidents reported to the police occurred on Facebook (N=22), email (N=19), and Twitter (N=9). This shows a significant difference between police and Tell MAMA data, where Facebook and Twitter have been roughly consistent in the latter, a higher proportion of incidents on Facebook are reported to the police.
Regarding the offline locations, categories such as household or private property (10%), place of business (10%), hospital (1%), took up the same percentage of the total incidents in both Tell MAMA and police data. Categories such as place of work, public area, road or highway, public institution, and Muslim institution also showed very small margins. Those with differing percentages were incidents on transport networks, which occupied 8% of Tell MAMA’s data, and 13% of police data, while incidents in educational institutions comprised 10% of Tell MAMA’s data and 3% of police data.

Incident categories show one significant variation between the two datasets; victims or witnesses of assault are much more likely to approach the police than Tell MAMA. On the other hand, victims or witnesses of discrimination are far more likely to approach Tell MAMA, owing to the non-criminal nature of such acts.

While hate speech occupied only 16% of online police incidents, 63% of online incidents reported to Tell MAMA were categorised at hate speech. Similarly, a higher proportion of abusive behaviour online was reported to the police (42%) than to Tell MAMA (21%), while threatening behaviour comprised 21% of police and 1% of Tell MAMA data. This indicates that hate speech is seen to be less ‘severe’ with a lower likelihood of pursuing criminal justice outcomes, while victims or witnesses of abusive and threatening behaviour online may be more likely to approach police forces.
7.1 The Effects of the Christchurch Terror Attack

In previous reports, Tell MAMA has documented several spikes and trigger events, each demonstrating how anti-Muslim incidents in public places reflect and respond to high-profile events. The Islamophobic attack in New Zealand became a significant trigger event for the UK. Hours after the news broke, Muslim communities in Britain were targeted. For example, in East London, a Muslim man faced anti-Muslim comments and was attacked with a hammer, three mosques were attacked with sledgehammers in Birmingham, and a man stabbed a Bulgarian teenager after a murderous rampage around Surrey. Continuing the concerning trend underpinning the spikes in our previous report, this spike shows hatred motivating further hatred. After Christchurch, the frequency and scope of incidents were unprecedented in the aftermath of an attack against Muslims.

In the week following the terror attacks at the mosques in Christchurch, incidents reported to Tell MAMA exponentially rose by 692%, with 12 incidents in the previous week (March 8 – 14) and 95 the following week (March 15 – 21).
Consistent with Tell MAMA data, the police data shows online, offline, and unknown incidents with corresponding peaks and troughs. When offline incidents increase, so do online incidents. The police timeline differs slightly from Tell MAMA’s, with a significant spike in offline anti-Muslim incidents shortly before the Christchurch attack.

The following graph shows the proportions of incidents within the spike period which directly referenced the Christchurch terror attacks.

The following graph shows the proportions of incidents within the spike period which directly referenced the Christchurch terror attacks.
At a street-level (offline), Tell MAMA recorded 10 incidents which took place on the 15th of March, the day of the terror attacks themselves. Of these incidents, 6 made no direct reference to the Christchurch attacks. For example, a Muslim man was outside his local mosque when he was called a “p*** b*****d” and assaulted, a Muslim mother and her young child faced threats while shopping and a station attendant asked a young Muslim woman if she had a bomb in her bag. Another victim who, on the same day, reported that a stranger verbally abused her in a car park, told Tell MAMA she was already feeling heightened anxiety and shock after hearing about the attacks in Christchurch. A man shouted “49! Yes! Yes!” – a reference to the rising death toll from New Zealand – at a Muslim woman and her daughter within hours, made headlines nationally.

In total, 74 offline incidents reported to Tell MAMA made verbal or symbolic references to the Christchurch terror attacks.

Typologies of abusive behaviour, threats, and assaults are typically the most common incidents reported to Tell MAMA. Abusive behaviour increased from 25 incidents in February to 41 incidents in March, a short-term increase of 64%. Many instances of abusive behaviour involve verbal abuse, for example, a mosque received an anonymous phone call from a man who said, “Do you know what has happened in New Zealand?!”, followed by “go back to your own country”.

More significantly, from February to March, threatening behaviour increased by 225%. Instances of threatening behaviour related to the Christchurch attacks included ‘shooting sounds’ and ‘gun gestures’ made towards Muslims, and several threats aimed at mosques or other Muslim institutions.

Similarly, the rates of vandalism increased by 163% between February and March. In the days following the Christchurch attacks, witnesses reported graffiti which did not directly relate to the attacks, including swastikas, ‘Muslim c***ts’, and ‘no Islam’. Elsewhere, one instance of graffiti said ‘subscribe to PewDiePie’ which was referenced in the Christchurch live stream. Beyond graffiti, one Muslim family had pork products left outside of their door while another had faeces thrown into their house, an Islamic school’s religious texts were torn apart, and several windows of cars and homes were smashed. Of the 21 incidents of vandalism which took place in March 2019, 10 targeted mosques and madrasas.

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254 Abbit, Beth. "’He shouted 49! Yes! Yes!… I was shocked’: This is what it’s like being a Muslim in Manchester now." Manchester Evening News. Last modified March 20, 2019. https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/he-shouted-49-you-yes-16001700.
The following graph shows where the incidents took place between each month.

Incidents in public areas increased by 192% between February and March, from 12 to 35 incidents respectively. Most significantly, incidents targeted at mosques or other Muslim institutions increased by 433% between February and March, from 3 to 16 incidents respectively. This again fell by 69% between March and April.

To further emphasise the gravity of the Christchurch spike, the following graph shows the percentage of the total incidents distributed across each month. The figures can be interpreted as follows; between January and June 2019, 35% of Tell MAMA’s online incidents occurred in March.
8 Conclusion

From the data shown in this report, it can be concluded that the mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand inspired attacks on Muslims in the UK. Alongside trends revealed in our 2018 Annual Report, this reporting period further demonstrates how the rise of the far-right and white nationalist movements relate to and are mutually implicated in the rise in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred.

Tell MAMA recorded a 692% spike in anti-Muslim hatred (offline and online) in the week following the Christchurch attacks. Not only was there a significant spike triggered by the initial attacks, but anti-Muslim incidents in the aftermath were also referencing the Christchurch attacks. Our data shows that 74 offline incidents made direct reference to the Christchurch attacks in the language used. Furthermore, Tell MAMA found a 433% increase in offline anti-Muslim attacks targeting mosques and other Muslim institutions in March.

There is, therefore, a clear link between a large-scale, violent anti-Muslim terror attack, which occurred at the opposite end of the planet, and a rise in anti-Muslim incidents in the UK.

The decrease in the number of ‘backlash’ or ‘retributive’ trends, and the continuing increase in anti-Muslim incidents which replicate, justify, or celebrate other anti-Muslim incidents, support the mounting evidence which shows that people with far-right views feel emboldened by other far-right successes.

Moreover, far-right extremists such as Brenton Tarrant, along with those who influenced him and were influenced by him, must be treated as an interconnected network founded in a terroristic, violent ideology. Incidents which occurred at heightened rates after the Christchurch attacks, such as hate speech online, assaults in public parks, and anti-Muslim graffiti, all relate and respond to each other. Anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia occur within a pattern of hatred, of trickle-down attitudes and stigmas, where individuals imbibe ideas and dehumanising and othering forms of stereotypes about groups from mainstream sources. Or in extreme cases, cultivate ideological feedback loops online to reinforce such polarised thinking. It further demonstrates how the glorification of far-right terrorism creates additional concerns extend once again into counter-terror legislation, an issue Tell MAMA highlighted following the terror attack on worshippers at a mosque in Finsbury Park in June 2017.

Nor were all acts in this spike hate crimes, but acts of discrimination, where fundamental rights are jeopardised, and Muslims find themselves denied services. This systemic problem should not be obscured by the hateful acts of individuals determined to harm Muslims and their religious institutions.
9 RECOMMENDATIONS

General

- There must be a renewed emphasis on providing security and safeguarding measures to Muslim institutions and centres.
- Media outlets must consider how their choice of language influences wider public discourse, particularly, after future trigger events, public figures and media platforms should work to counter the “us vs. them” narrative which often emerges in the aftermath.
- Tell MAMA has continued to urge social media platforms and search engine providers to limit those on the far-right who breach hateful conduct policies and who promote hyperpartisan content under the auspices of “news”. As our 2018 report states: “The growth of hyperpartisan alternative news platforms, saturated in pro-Tommy Robinson content, gained notable attention in 2018 and 2019, creating a bivouac of ideological content”. Tell MAMA made similar recommendations in its 2016 annual report, published in 2017, warning how far-right websites had gamed Google’s algorithm through legal Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) methods.255
- Social media platforms should encourage users to report any extremist or hateful language to the relevant authorities and to trusted flaggers like Tell MAMA.
- The glorification of terrorism against Muslims whether here or abroad go beyond the remit of hate crime and into the realm of anti-terrorism legislation. Given the growing far-right threat, due consideration must be given when investigating such reports, especially in the online world.

10 APPENDIX

For this report, we have approached Twitter and Facebook for their response regarding the Christchurch attacks and extremism on their platforms.

10.1 *facebook*

10.1.1 Video Footage Viewing
- The video was viewed fewer than 200 times during the live broadcast. No users reported the video during the live broadcast. Including the views during the live broadcast, the video was viewed about 4000 times in total before being removed from Facebook.
- The first user report on the original video came in 29 minutes after the video started, and 12 minutes after the live broadcast ended.
- Before we were alerted to the video, a user on 8chan posted a link to a copy of the video on a file-sharing site.
- We removed the original Facebook Live video and hashed it so that other shares that are visually similar to that video are then detected and automatically removed from Facebook and Instagram.
- Some variants such as screen recordings were more difficult to detect, so we expanded to additional detection systems including the use of audio technology.
- In the first 24 hours, we removed about 1.5 million videos of the attack globally. More than 1.2 million of those videos were blocked at upload and were therefore prevented from being seen on our services.

10.1.2 Global Internet Forum To Counter Terrorism - Call To Action
- Facebook was a leader in setting up the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), an initiative encouraged by the UK Home Office of which we became Chair this year.
- Following the Christchurch terror attack in February 2019, Facebook along with Microsoft, Twitter, Google and Amazon signed up to the Christchurch Call to Action. The technology companies also committed to a nine-point plan that sets out concrete steps the industry will take to address the abuse of technology to spread terrorist content.
- The horrific terrorist attack highlighted the importance of close communication between members, and between government and the wider industry, which is why we are introducing joint content incident protocols to enable and empower companies to more quickly and effectively respond to emerging and active events.
- The protocol, which can be triggered by a real-world event involving murder or attempted murder of defenceless civilians or innocents, outlines steps that tech companies can take to respond quickly to an attack. Based on the joint protocols, we will work together to categorize the type of incident and the anticipated level and degree of online impact. We will also set up formal channels of communication so we can share intelligence and content with non-GIFCT companies and other stakeholders, as needed.

10.1.3 Policy Changes & Investment
- Following the horrific terrorist attacks in New Zealand, we’ve been reviewing what more we can do to limit our services from being used to cause harm or spread hate. As a direct result, people who have broken certain rules on Facebook — including our Dangerous Organizations and Individuals policy — will be restricted from using Facebook Live.
• We will now apply a ‘one strike’ policy to Live in connection with a broader range of offences. From now on, anyone who violates our most serious policies will be restricted from using Live for set periods – for example, 30 days – starting on their first offence. For instance, someone who shares a link to a statement from a terrorist group with no context will now be immediately blocked from using Live for a set period.
• Tackling these threats also requires technical innovation to stay ahead of the type of adversarial media manipulation we saw after Christchurch when some people modified the video to avoid detection to repost it after it had been taken down. This will require research across industry and academia.
• To that end, we’re also investing $7.5 million in new research partnerships with leading academics from three universities, designed to improve image and video analysis technology.
• In March, we announced a ban on praise, support and representation of white nationalism and white separatism on Facebook and Instagram. It’s clear that these concepts are deeply linked to organized hate groups and have no place on our services.
• We also need to get better and faster at finding and removing hate from our platforms. Over the past few years, we have improved our ability to use machine learning and artificial intelligence to find material from terrorist groups. Last fall, we started using similar tools to extend our efforts to a range of hate groups globally, including white supremacists.
• We are now connecting people who search for terms associated with white supremacy to resources focused on helping people leave behind hate groups. People searching for these terms will be directed to Life After Hate, an organization founded by former violent extremists that provide crisis intervention, education, support groups and outreach.
• Facebook also provided ad credit grants to organisations across the world, including in the UK to Tell MAMA, to support their counter-speech efforts on social media following the incident.

10.1.4 Safety Check for Christchurch
The Safety check was turned on for the incident. More information about how safety checks are triggered can be found here: https://www.facebook.com/help/1761941604022087

10.1.5 Partnership with Met Police
• The video of the attack in Christchurch did not prompt our automatic detection systems because we did not have enough content depicting first-person footage of violent events to effectively train our machine learning technology.
• That’s why we’re working with the Metropolitan Police, thanks to our long-standing positive relationship, to obtain camera footage from their firearms training programs – providing a valuable source of data to train our systems to recognise first-person footage of terrorists. As part of this project, we equipped the Police with Go Pro cameras, which they have used in their mandatory training since October 2019, creating hundreds of hours of footage per week for ingesting in our machine learning.
• The aim is to ensure that if/when emergency incidents occur on Live, we have the tools and response mechanisms available to identify the specific broadcasts associated with the incidents and handle them appropriately.
• To gain as much footage and environmental diversity as possible, we are in talks with Law Enforcement Agencies in other countries around the world who are interested in partnering with us to help us achieve these objectives.
In May, we signed the Christchurch Call. The Call outlines collective, voluntary commitments from Governments and online service providers intended to address the issue of terrorist and violent extremist content online and to prevent the abuse of the internet as occurred in and after the Christchurch attacks.

**To that end, we, the online service providers, commit to:**

Take transparent, specific measures seeking to prevent the upload of terrorist and violent extremist content and to prevent its dissemination on social media and similar content-sharing services, including its immediate and permanent removal, without prejudice to law enforcement and user appeals requirements, in a manner consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms. Cooperative measures to achieve these outcomes may include technology development, the expansion and use of shared databases of hashes and URLs, and effective notice and takedown procedures.

Provide greater transparency in the setting of community standards or terms of service, including by:

- Outlining and publishing the consequences of sharing terrorist and violent extremist content;
- Describing policies and putting in place procedures for detecting and removing terrorist and violent extremist content.

Enforce those community standards or terms of service in a manner consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms, including by:

- Prioritising moderation of terrorist and violent extremist content, however, identified;
- Closing accounts where appropriate;
- Providing efficient complaints and appeals process for those wishing to contest the removal of their content or a decision to decline the upload of their content.
- Implement immediate, effective measures to mitigate the specific risk that terrorist and violent extremist content is disseminated through livestreaming, including identification of content for real-time review.

Implement regular and transparent public reporting, in a way that is measurable and supported by clear methodology, on the quantity and nature of terrorist and violent extremist content being detected and removed.

Review the operation of algorithms and other processes that may drive users towards and/or amplify terrorist and violent extremist content to better understand possible intervention points and to implement changes where this occurs. This may include using algorithms and other processes to redirect users from such content or the promotion of credible, positive alternatives or counter-narratives. This may include building appropriate mechanisms for reporting, designed in a multi-stakeholder process and without compromising trade secrets or the effectiveness of service providers’ practices through unnecessary disclosure.

Work together to ensure cross-industry efforts are coordinated and robust, for instance by investing in and expanding the GIFCT, and by sharing knowledge and expertise.
We, Governments and online service providers commit to working collectively to:

Work with civil society to promote community-led efforts to counter violent extremism in all its forms, including through the development and promotion of positive alternatives and counter-messaging.

Develop effective interventions, based on trusted information sharing about the effects of algorithmic and other processes, to redirect users from terrorist and violent extremist content.

Accelerate research into and development of technical solutions to prevent the upload of and to detect and immediately remove terrorist and violent extremist content online, and share these solutions through open channels, drawing on expertise from academia, researchers, and civil society.

Support research and academic efforts to better understand, prevent and counter-terrorist and violent extremist content online, including both the offline and online impacts of this activity.

Ensure appropriate cooperation with and among law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute illegal online activity regarding detected and/or removed terrorist and violent extremist content, in a manner consistent with rule of law and human rights protections.

Support smaller platforms as they build capacity to remove terrorist and violent extremist content, including through sharing technical solutions and relevant databases of hashes or other relevant material, such as the GIFCT shared database.

Collaborate, and support partner countries, in the development and implementation of best practice in preventing the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content online, including through operational coordination and trusted information exchanges in accordance with relevant data protection and privacy rules.

Develop processes allowing governments and online service providers to respond rapidly, effectively and in a coordinated manner to the dissemination of terrorist or violent extremist content following a terrorist event. This may require the development of a shared crisis protocol and information-sharing processes, in a manner consistent with human rights protections.

Respect, and for Governments protect, human rights, including by avoiding directly or indirectly contributing to adverse human rights impacts through business activities and addressing such impacts where they occur.

Recognise the important role of civil society in supporting work on the issues and commitments in the Call, including through:

- Offering expert advice on implementing the commitments in this Call in a manner consistent with free, open and secure internet and with international human rights law;
- Working, including with governments and online service providers, to increase transparency;
• Where necessary, working to support users through company appeals and complaints processes.
• Affirm our willingness to continue to work together, in existing fora and relevant organizations, institutions, mechanisms and processes to assist one another and to build momentum and widen support for the Call.

Develop and support a range of practical, non-duplicative initiatives to ensure that this pledge is delivered.

Acknowledge that governments, online service providers, and civil society may wish to take further cooperative action to address a broader range of harmful online content, such as the actions that will be discussed further during the G7 Biarritz Summit, in the G20, the Aqaba Process, the Five Country Ministerial, and a range of other fora.

Further action

In May, we also shared this public update. In addition to our commitment to the Christchurch Call, us, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon commit to the following:

Five Individual Actions:

1. Terms of Use. We commit to updating our terms of use, community standards, codes of conduct, and acceptable use policies to expressly prohibit the distribution of terrorist and violent extremist content. We believe this is important to establish baseline expectations for users and to articulate a clear basis for removal of this content from our platforms and services and suspension or closure of accounts distributing such content.

2. User Reporting of Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content. We commit to establishing one or more methods within our online platforms and services for users to report or flag inappropriate content, including terrorist and violent extremist content. We will ensure that the reporting mechanisms are clear, conspicuous, and easy to use, and provide enough categorical granularity to allow the company to prioritize and act promptly upon notification of terrorist or violent extremist content.

3. Enhancing Technology. We commit to continuing to invest in technology that improves our capability to detect and remove terrorist and violent extremist content online, including the extension or development of digital fingerprinting and AI-based technology solutions.

4. Livestreaming. We commit to identifying appropriate checks on livestreaming, aimed at reducing the risk of disseminating terrorist and violent extremist content online. These may include enhanced vetting measures (such as streamer ratings or scores, account activity, or validation processes) and moderation of certain livestreaming events where appropriate. Checks on livestreaming necessarily will be tailored to the context of specific livestreaming services, including the type of audience, the nature or character of the livestreaming service, and the likelihood of exploitation.
5. Transparency Reports. We commit to publishing on a regular basis transparency reports regarding detection and removal of terrorist or violent extremist content on our online platforms and services and ensuring that the data is supported by a reasonable and explainable methodology.

Four Collaborative Actions:

1. Share Technology Development. We commit working collaboratively across the industry, governments, educational institutions, and NGOs to develop a shared understanding of the contexts in which terrorist and violent extremist content is published and to improve technology to detect and remove terrorist and violent extremist content more effectively and efficiently. This will include:
   - Work to create robust shared data sets to accelerate machine learning and AI and sharing insights and learnings from the data.
   - Development of open source or other shared tools to detect and remove terrorist or violent extremist content.
   - Enablement of all companies, large and small, to contribute to the collective effort and to better address detection and removal of this content on their platforms and services.

2. Crisis Protocols. We commit to working collaboratively across industry, governments, and NGOs to create a protocol for responding to emerging or active events, on an urgent basis, so relevant information can be quickly and efficiently shared, processed, and acted upon by all stakeholders with minimal delay. This includes the establishment of incident management teams that coordinate actions and broadly distribute information that is in the public interest.

3. Education. We commit to working collaboratively across industry governments, educational institutions, and NGOs to help understand and educate the public about terrorist and extremist violent content online. This educating and reminding users about how to report or otherwise not contribute to the spread of this content online.

4. Combatting Hate and Bigotry. We commit to working collaboratively across industry to attack the root causes of extremism and hate online. This includes providing greater support for relevant research — with an emphasis on the impact of online hate on offline discrimination and violence — and supporting capacity and capability of NGOs working to challenge hate and promote pluralism and respect online.

Other Twitter updates:

Last year, we shared that building a Twitter free of abuse, malicious automation, and behaviour that distorts and distracts from the public conversation is our top priority. Within the last 12 months, we have made substantial strides in tackling abusive content on the platform. There will always be more to do, but we have made meaningful progress. Here are key highlights from that work, which relate to the latest reporting period (January 1 to June 30, 2019) and which we have shared publicly:

- More than 50% of Tweets we take action on for abuse are now proactively surfaced using technology, rather than relying on reports to Twitter;
- 105% increase in accounts actioned by Twitter (locked or suspended for violating the Twitter Rules);
- There was a 48% increase in accounts reported for potential violations of our hateful conduct policies. We actioned 133% more accounts compared to the last reporting period.
- We saw a 22% increase in accounts reported for potential violations of our abuse policies. We took action on 68% more accounts compared to the last reporting period.

This is further to the announcements we made in April 2019:

- 16% fewer abuse reports after an interaction from an account the reporter doesn't follow.
- 100,000 accounts suspended for creating new accounts after a suspension during January-March 2019 - a 45% increase from the same time last year.
- 60% faster response to appeals requests with our new in-app appeal process.
- 3 times more abusive accounts suspended within 24 hours after a report compared to the same time last year.
- 2.5 times more private information removed with a new, easier reporting process